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HEADQUARTERS

COMBINED ARMS CENTER AND FORT LEAVENWORTH

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027

ATZL-TDP-D

23 SEP 1981

SUBJECT: Combined Arms Sufficiency Study

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1. The attached Combined Arms Sufficiency Study ~~was prepared at the~~ ^{PO REGISTER} direction of Commander, Combined Arms Center with the cooperation of TRADOC school commandants. The study is a comparative review of the sufficiency of combined arms instruction in officer basic and advanced courses in all TRADOC schools. It contains a complete verified list of combined arms subjects, and includes an analysis of sufficiency levels identified for these subjects.

2. An action plan addressing the study findings is currently being prepared and will be provided in the near future.

FOR THE COMMANDER: •

1 Incl
as

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COMBINED ARMS
SUFFICIENCY STUDY

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

GENERAL

1. Combined Arms training is at the core of an officer's education. The Combined Arms Sufficiency Study was initiated to determine in a systematic fashion which subjects should be identified as combined arms subjects and what constitutes a sufficient level of proficiency in these combined arms subjects for lieutenants and captains in the U.S. Army. For the purposes of this study combined arms sufficiency was defined as the knowledge required by the combat, combat support, and combat service support officer that enables him to work effectively with his fellow officers on the modern battlefield. The study was conducted between May and August 1981 at the direction of the Commander, Combined Arms Center.

2. Participants are listed at Annex A. Methodology is described at Annex F. The study was designed to systematically assess the status of combined arms training at TRADOC schools by obtaining the collective judgment of the branch school commandants on what subjects should be on a combined arms subject list and what constitutes a sufficient level of instruction for each subject. This approach did not allow the use of rigorous statistical techniques for data analysis; nevertheless, the use of a few simple statistical methods and close inspection of the results allowed us to make several useful, if somewhat subjective, observations about the current state of combined arms training.

3. The data collected are consolidated at Annex B, with the exception of those concerning pre-commissioning. The responses on pre-commissioning are discussed in Annex H.

4. As it now stands, this study represents a first step towards providing a clear focus on the combined arms training issue, and, in essence, the mission of the Combined Arms Center. The results of the study are not intended to provide exact, definitive guidance for all commandants in all circumstances. Rather, the intent is to provide some direction to the search for sufficient combined arms instruction for officers. It is clear from the results of the study that there is interaction between combined arms sufficiency and branch sufficiency and that this interaction occurs on both objective and subjective levels. This study emphasizes the importance of professional subjective judgement, and does so in a manner that will give it greater credibility in the overall development of officer training programs. We view sufficiency as a moving target which tends to defy precise measurement. We have settled for a somewhat subjective snapshot of where we are at this moment in time, realizing that in many cases the very act of taking the photo changes what we are looking at. We believe that sufficiency should become even more dynamic, with even more interaction between the proponent of a subject and the service schools that are teaching the subject. This study is intended to facilitate such interaction. In our conclusions we have not attempted to state specific recommendations for each problem cited, for no single answer is applicable.

What we have attempted to do is illuminate the whole spectrum of combined arms subjects; provide an evolving tool for the on-going management of combined arms subjects; and define some levels of sufficiency to guide TRADOC school commandants to a more standardized and balanced treatment of critical combined arms subjects.

FINDINGS

5. There appears to be general consensus that the subjects selected for the study are, in fact, the combined arms subjects which schools should address. At Annex C is an analysis of the combined arms subjects list which shows the percentage of respondents that rated officers' requirements for each subject at the 1 (fully proficient) or 2 (working knowledge) level.

6. As noted earlier, our analysis was done primarily by inspecting the data. We found we were able to group assessments of the subjects into three broad categories: Sufficient (coverage considered appropriate), Insufficient (subjects judged to be insufficiently covered in existing POI), and Not Determined (significant disparities in judgement on sufficiency).

a. Within the Sufficient category are grouped subjects which received both high and low sufficiency level ratings. In general, coverage of the subjects appears adequate. There may be, however, instances where individual schools are out of the general pattern either in their view of what constitutes sufficiency or their current coverage of the subject. These will be reviewed with the affected schools on an individual basis. A list of the subjects in this category is at Appendix I to Annex D.

b. In the Insufficient category are subjects where the sufficiency levels indicate inadequate attention is being given these subjects at a number of schools. Re-examination of current programs of instruction is warranted. Proponents for these subjects should review the adequacy of support to the field and coordinate with the field to improve coverage. Subjects we judge to be insufficiently covered are:

(1) Threat Background. On average, less than half the schools rate this subject as requiring a sufficiency level of 1 (fully proficient) or 2 (working knowledge) at the lieutenant level. Because of the way many schools organize their threat instruction, this is a difficult subject to assign a specific number of hours. Nevertheless, there appears to be a need for more standardized coverage of threat subjects at both lieutenant and captain level.

(2) Tactical Intelligence. The study showed a broad perception that this was not an important subject. Because virtually every officer on the battlefield participates in the collection and dissemination of intelligence, this subject deserves more attention.

(3) Patrolling. Several schools rated patrolling low, and it is missing from several POIs. Patrolling in itself is not a skill in which every officer has a need to be fully proficient. However, as a medium through which some of the fundamentals of leadership, land navigation and tactical intelligence may be learned, patrolling training is very effective. Schools that have deleted patrolling from the POIs should review its utility in this light.

(4) Military Operations in Urban Terrain. Urban terrain provides some uniquely difficult challenges to everyone on the battlefield. This may be a subject area that should be integrated throughout a school's combined arms instruction. Although the sufficiency levels reported appear appropriate, the hours, in many cases, seem low.

(5) Army Aviation. The general range of responses show a lack of attention to this subject. In this subject area explicit guidance is available from the chain of command and the proponent. All branches are users of aviation assets and all branches need a basic familiarity with this key actor on the battlefield.

(6) Engineer Operations. The responses in this subject area seem to reflect a significant misunderstanding of the role engineers play in maintaining mobility and enhancing survivability throughout the battle area. Sufficiency levels, especially for captains, need to be upgraded and POIs adjusted accordingly.

(7) Electronic Warfare. This is an area that requires careful review, and perhaps more adequate guidance from the proponent. It is also an area that is already receiving some attention from the schools. Based on the responses to this study, however, a consensus on just what is appropriate in current POIs is lacking.

(8) Training Management. There has been rather explicit guidance to the field for this subject. There is, nevertheless, a wide variation reported on hours of instruction needed to achieve sufficiency. This indicates a need for the proponent to review this area, and a need for the schools to review their POIs.

(9) A consolidated list of subjects judged to be Insufficient is at Appendix 2 to Annex D.

c. In the Not Determined category are those subjects which, though the schools may agree on the appropriate level of sufficiency, show a wide

variation in judgments on how many hours are needed to reach the recommended sufficiency level. We are unable to determine, based on the study data, whether coverage is sufficient or not. One cause for disparity of responses in these subject areas appears to be problems with subject definition. Thus, there is an apparent need to obtain a clearer definition of the subject area from the proponent. Examples of these problem subjects are Leadership, Defense, and Combat Service Support. These are discussed in detail at Annex E. A complete list of the subjects is at Appendix 3 to Annex D.

7. Our analysis revealed another aspect of combined arms training that deserves further consideration: There are a number of subjects which were generally rated low for lieutenants and high for captains. It appears that training at the lieutenant level on some combined arms subjects is being deferred because of a perceived need to have an officer achieve, in the formal training time available, maximum possible technical competence in higher priority, branch-unique skills. Examination of the results of the officer job/task analysis reinforces this viewpoint, since that process tends to highlight skills needed immediately following the officer basic course. At Appendix 1 to Annex C is a list of subjects that fall into this category. In some cases deferral may be entirely appropriate; however, this listing deserves consideration as training strategies continue to be refined, especially at schools where these subjects overlap with those identified as receiving insufficient emphasis.

8. At Appendix 2 to Annex C, is a list of subjects generally rated low for both captains and lieutenants. The implication is that training in these subjects is now limited to those officers who have a need to know, deferred to the CGSC level, or conducted on the job.

DISCUSSION

9. The subjective approach taken by this study was valuable because it allowed the judgment of senior officers and subject matter experts to receive due weight on an equal footing with training development data. The establishment of a combined arms subject list on which there is reasonable consensus, and the rating of contents of that list in the context of the concept of sufficiency provided a fresh perspective, along with some definition of the issue of what combined arms training ought to be. It is obviously difficult, however, to separate this subjective rating effort from the practical constraints on available resources. For example, proponents recommended a total of almost 700 hours for CSS lieutenants in these subjects. Obviously such time is not available to the trainer. Thus, when reviewing the study data, we believe it will be more useful to use the hours

associated with a particular sufficiency level as a measure of the subject's complexity than to view these hours in terms of resource demands.

10. It is possible to think about the teaching of combined arms sufficiency in terms of performance objectives. For example, several schools have one or more extensive practical exercises that lead students through the commander's estimate to the production of a complete operations order with overlays and annexes. To meet this requirement a rather sound grasp (for the successful student) of the fundamentals of combined arms operation is required.

11. As the study progressed it became obvious that there were different approaches to teaching combined arms subjects in each of the schools, and that there were ideas that should be shared between schools, and by the proponents.

a. One traditional method of keeping service school faculty members alert to ideas and changes has been for them to periodically go "home" and receive guidance from their branch chiefs. For example, infantrymen teaching at other schools should visit Fort Benning periodically; AG officers should visit Fort Benjamin Harrison; the MI officers should go home to Fort Huachuca; etc. This is a way to keep combined arms coverage current and appropriate. Clearly, it is the signal officer at Fort Knox, kept current by his branch, who has the best opportunity to see that his branch's view of the combined arms picture is part of the Armor School curriculum-development process. This method is effective and should be encouraged.

b. CATRADA, in its role as a training integrator, can perform a useful function in this area by insuring communications between the schools. Additionally, there appears to be potential for using technology to develop and communicate the fundamentals of combined arms operations to both instructors and students. This possibility will be examined in more depth as review of combined arms sufficiency continues.

12. This study can be cross-linked with Officer Job/Task Analysis (OJTA). If this subject list is valid, and we think it is, the tasks identified through OJTA should sort out under the subjects selected for this study. If that does not happen, there may be problems with either this list, the OJTA task list, or both; although we must re-emphasize that the results of this study are weighted by the opinions of responsible senior officers currently serving in TRADOC, whereas OJTA tends to be weighted by the view points of immediate supervisors in the field. A comparison of the pre-commissioning data (Annex H) to the Military Qualification Standards I list tends to show the two viewpoints to be complementary. We believe that the findings of this study can assist the setting of priorities to train OJTA-identified tasks, and may be useful to the site-selection process.

CONCLUSIONS

13. The combined arms subjects list used in this study was coordinated with all school commandants. Though we did not obtain unequivocal, universal consensus that each subject listed, and only those subjects, constitute the combined arms subjects, it is clear that the present list is as near to a consensus statement of what the combined arms subjects are as is possible at this time. It should be accepted as such by all commandants and used as the baseline list of combined arms subjects to be considered during future officer POI development and revision. At the same time it is recognized that the list is dynamic, subject to change and adjustment as combined arms training requirements evolve.

14. The data shown in Annex B, as discussed in this report, provide the commandants a useful tool in the development of POI. We recognize that despite the objective precision possible through the OJTA process, many facets of officer training will, to a substantial degree, continue to require the subjective judgment of the commandant. These data will provide him a framework for more balanced decisionmaking and, if applied to the training development process, should bring a certain level of standardization to combined arms coverage throughout TRADOC schools.

15. The study has had an important corollary effect on combined arms training by causing commandants to do some self analysis of their own branches' coverage of combined arms subjects. Review of the results of the study should promote comparative examination of combined arms coverage in other schools, which in turn can lead to the exchange of ideas about how combined arms training can be improved.

16. The grouping of combined arms subject coverage under categories of sufficiency (Sufficient, Insufficient, Not Determined) will allow commandants to concentrate efforts on "fixing what's broke" without at the same time diffusing effort on unnecessary reviews and revisions.

a. Subjects in the Insufficient category deserve careful review by all schools to verify adequacy of subject coverage and to take corrective actions where indicated. Proponents in particular should reexamine the adequacy of guidance to the field and take steps to promote improved subject coverage.

b. Subjects in the Sufficient and Not Determined categories deserve review by each commandant to assure that present coverage is valid and as complete as required.

17. The role of the subject proponent probably needs clarification and emphasis. Proponents could make a major contribution to this effort by providing mutually understood definitions of the specific subjects, by re-examining their own input in view of the data available in this study, and by reinforcing lines of communications to the teachers of their subjects in

the field. Most of the near-term future actions on combined arms sufficiency will require proponent involvement. This is discussed in more detail at Annex E.

18. A major benefit of this study, and the process it has initiated, is clarification of the role of the Combined Arms Center within the TRADOC school system. For the first time we have a reference document that describes what officer combined arms training looks like and some of its strengths and weaknesses. We are now in the process of developing an action plan as a follow-on to this study. The plan is expected to emphasize those actions that should be taken to improve combined arms instruction in officer training TRADOC-wide.

19. We recognize that we have identified more questions than answers. We will in the future be examining in more detail methods to resolve discrepancies, improve weaknesses, and reinforce strengths that we have noted.

ANNEXES

A - Study Participants

B - Data

C - Overall Sufficiency Level of Subjects

Appendix 1 - Subjects Rated Low for Lieutenants and High for Captains

Appendix 2 - Subjects Rated Low for Lieutenants and Captains

D - Grouping of Subjects by Category

Appendix 1 - Sufficient

Appendix 2 - Insufficient

Appendix 3 - Not Determined

E - The Role of Proponents in Combined Arms Sufficiency

F - Methodology

Appendix 1 - Proponency Evaluation Form

Appendix 2 - Branch Evaluation Form

G - Consolidated Subject List

H - Pre-Commissioning Data

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX A

STUDY PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Army Academy of Health Sciences
U.S. Army Air Defense Center and School
U.S. Army Armor Center and School
U.S. Army Aviation Center and School
U.S. Army Chemical School
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
U.S. Army Engineer School
U.S. Army Field Artillery School
U.S. Army Infantry School
U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School
U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's School
U.S. Army Logistics Center
U.S. Army Military Police School
U.S. Army Missile and Munitions Center and School
U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School
U.S. Army Quartermaster School
U.S. Army Signal Center
U.S. Army Soldier Support Center
U.S. Army Transportation School

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX B

DATA

1. The data for lieutenants and captains are displayed in this annex. Data for pre-commissioning are at Annex H. Methodology and formats used for data collection are at Annex F.
2. For each subject, data are displayed for lieutenants and captains.
 - a. SL: Sufficiency Level.
 - 1- Officer must be fully proficient in subject.
 - 2- Officer must have working knowledge of subject.
 - 3- Officer must be familiar with subject.
 - 4- No training required.
 - b. HRS (S): Number of hours of instruction equated to sufficiency level.
 - c. HRS (P): Number of hours currently in POI.
3. Branch schools responses are displayed vertically under an abbreviated title. The MM column reports data for courses for specialities 73 (Missile Material Management) and 75 (Munitions Material Management). The MS Column is a consolidated report for Army Medical Department officers. In the AV column warrant officer training is reported. Note j applies to lieutenants data and note p applies to captains data. Aviation data was not included in the analyses at Annexes C and D.
4. Proponents' responses are grouped according to recommendations for combat arms, combat support, and combat service support. Proponent(s) for each subject are shown on the right.
5. A consolidated listing of subjects and proponents is at Annex G.

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

SUBJECTS

BRANCH SCHOOLS

PROPOONENT

1. Doctrinal Foundation:

a. Mission and Role of the US Army

LT	SL	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	FM	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AvP	CA	CS	CSS
	SL	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	2	3	2	2	2	1	2	2	3/3	1	1	1
	HR(S)	1	4	.5	3	1	4	4	0	2	3	2	2	2	2	2.5	1	2/2	2	2	2
	HR(P)	1	2	0	2	1	4	2	0	1	4	2	1	1	0	1	1	2/0			
CPT	SL	2	1	3	1	2	1	1	1	2	3	1 ^h	2	2	1	2	1	3/3	1	1	1
	HR(S)	1	1	.5	2	1	2	4	0	6	0	1	2	1	3	2	1	1/2	2	2	2
	HR(P)	1	1	0	2	0	0	3	0	.1	0		0	0	0	2	0	1/2			

b. Principles of War

LT	SL	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	FM	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AvP	CA	CS	CSS
	SL	3	2	3	1	2	3	3	1	2	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	4/3	1	2	2
	HR(S)	1	2	.5	2	1	0	2	0	2	2	1	1	1	2	4	2	0/4	2	2	2
	HR(P)	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	0	0	2	1	1	0/1			
CPT	SL	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	3	1	2	2	2	2	1	3	1	2	2
	HR(S)	2	1	.5	3	1	2/0 ^c	6	0	3	0	1	1	1	5	3	2	1	2	2	2
	HR(P)	2	1	.5	3	.3	0	3	0	1			0	0	2	1	1	0			

c. US Army Operational Concepts (AirLand Battle)

(1) Enemy Air Defenses

LT	SL	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	FM	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AvP	CA	CS	CSS
	SL	4	3	1	3	4	4	3	4	2	3	3 ^h	3	3	4	2	3	4/2	3	3	4
	HR(S)	0	1	.2	2	0	0	1	0	1	.5	2	1	1	0	2	1	0/3	2	0	0
	HR(P)	0	1	.2	2	0	0	.5	0	.2	0	2	0	0	1	2	0	0/1			
CPT	SL	3	2	1	2	3	4	3	1	2	3	2 ^h	3	3	3	2	3	2/3	1	3	3
	HR(S)	1	1	.2	2	1	0	1	10	2	.5	3	1	1	1	2	1	3/1	4	4	4
	HR(P)	1	1	.2	1	.3	0	.5	3	1	.2		0	0	1	2	0	3/1			

(2) Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

LT	SL	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	FM	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AvP	CA	CS	CSS
	SL	4	2	1	3	4	4	3	4	2	3		4	4	4	3	4	4/2	2	4	4
	HR(S)	0	1	.5	1	0	0	.5	0	1	.2		0	0	0	1	0	0/3	2	0	0
	HR(P)	0	1	.5	0	0	0	0	0	.1	0		0	0	0	1	0	0/1			
CPT	SL	3	1	1	2	3	4	3	1	2	3		3	4	3	3	3	2/3	1	3	3
	HR(S)	1	2	2	3	1	0	1	5	2	.5		1	0	1	2	1	3/1	4	2	2
	HR(P)	1	2	.6	3	.3	0	0	2	.1	.4		0	0	0	1	0	3/1			

(3) Close Air Support

LT	SL	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	FM	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AvP	CA	CS	CSS
	SL	3	2	1	3	3	3	3	2	2	3		3	3	3	2	4	4/2	1	3	3
	HR(S)	1	4	11	1	2	2	3	5	1	.5		1	1	1	3	0	0/4	4	2	2
	HR(P)	1	2	10	0	0	5	3	1	.5	0		0	0	0	2	0	0/1			
CPT	SL	2	1	1	2	3	3	2	1	1	3		3	3	2	2	3	2/3	1	2	2
	HR(S)	1	4	15	2	2	1	3	5	3	.5		1	1	2	4	1	4/1	8	4	4
	HR(P)	1	4	15	0	2	1	3	2	.5	.1		0	0	0	4	0	4/1			

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPORTION

		IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	UD	NM ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CS		
		LT	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)
(4) Airspace Management		4	3	1	3	4	3	4	4	4	2	3	4	4	3	3	4	4/3	2	4	4	CGSC	
		0	1	.1	1	0	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0/4	4	0	0		
		0	.5	.1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0/0					
		CPT	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)
		3	2	1	2	4	3	4	3	4	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	3/4	2	3	3	CGSC	
		1	2	4.2	2	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	1	1	1	1/0	4	4	4		
		0	.5	4.2	2	0	0	0	0	0	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0/0					
(5) Protection of Sensors and Deep Attack Systems		4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	3	3	4	4/3	3	4	4	CGSC	
		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	.5	0	0	1	1	0	0/2	1	0	0		
		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0/0					
		CPT	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)
		3	3	3	3	3	4	3	1	2	2	3	4	4	3	3	4	3/4	3	2	2	CGSC	
		1	1	.4	1	1	0	1	25	1	0	.5	0	0	1	1	0	1/0	2	4	4		
		0	5	.4	1	.3	0	0	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5	0	1/0					
(6) Extended Battlefield		4	3	4	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	4	4/2	3	3	3	CGSC	
		0	1	0	3	1	1	2	10	3	0	.3	1	3	2	2	0	0/2	2	1	1		
		0	0	0	3	0	0	2	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0/3					
		CPT	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)
		3	2	3	2	2	3	2	1	1	1	3	2	2	2	2	3	2/3	1	3	3	CGSC	
		1	1	1.7	2	2	2	4	3	4	.5	1	1	3	3	3	1	2/1	8	2	2		
		0	0	1.7	1	2	1	4	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1/3					
d. Underlying Fundamentals of Modern Combat		3	2	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	4/2	1	1	1	CGSC	
		1	2	1.7	1	2	3	2	10	3	8	1	2	3	4	3	3	0/5	8	4	4		
		0	0	0	1	1	3	1	10	3	4	1	0	0	0	2	3	0/2					
		CPT	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)
		2	1	3	1	2	2	1	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2/3	1	1	1	CGSC	
		2	2	1.7	2	2	2	6	10	4	1	1	2	3	6	3	3	2/2	8	4	4		
		2	0	1.7	2	1	0	3	10	1	.5	2	2	3	3	4	3	0/2					
Threat Background		3	2	1	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	4/3	2	2	2	CACDA	
		1	1	.8	.5	1	.5	1	1	1	2	5	2	3	2	2	1	0/1	.5	.5	.5		
		1	1	.2	.5	1	.1	1	0	.5	2	5	1	1	1	1	.3	0/1					
a. Mission and Role of the Armed Forces		3	2	1	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	2 ^h	2	3	3	2	2	3	1	1	1	CACDA	
		1	1	.8	.5	1	.5	1	1	1	2	5	2	3	1	2	2	2	1	1	1		
		1	1	.2	.5	1	.1	1	0	.5	2	5	1	1	1	1	.3	0/1					
		CPT	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)	SL	HR(S)	HR(P)
		3	1	1	2	3	3	2	2	1	2	2 ^h	2	3	3	2	2	3	1	1	1	CACDA	
		2	1	16	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	8	2	3	1	2	2	2	1	1	1		
		2	1	.2	.5	1	2	1	2	2	.5		0	4	1	3	1	2					

SUBJECTS

BRANCH SCHOOLS

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		IN	AR	FA	AU	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OU	MM ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AVP	CA	CS	CSS		
b. Organizations and Equipment	LT	SL	3	2	1	2	3	3	3	2	2		2	3	2	2	2	3	4/3	1	1	1	CACDA
	HRS(S)	1	4	8	2	2	.5	2	1	1	1		2	1	3	2	1	0/6	2	2	2		
	HRS(P)	1	3	2	.5	3	.3	1	0	.5	2		0	0	1	1	.3	0/6					
c. Offensive Operations	CPT	SL	3	1	1	2	3	2	1	1	2		2	3	2	2	3	3/3	1	1	1	CACDA	
	HRS(S)	2	4	16	1	2	1	4	18	2	1		4	1	3	2	1	2/1	3	3	3		
	HRS(P)	2	4	4	.5	3	1	1	18	7	.5		0	0	1	3	0	2/1					
d. Defensive Operations	LT	SL	3	2	1	2	2	3	3	2	3		3	3	2	2	3	4/2	2	2	3	CACDA	
	HRS(S)	1	2	8	2	2	.5	1	1	3	1		0	1	4	2	1	0/2	.5	.5	.5		
	HRS(P)	1	0	1.7	.5	1	.3	.5	0	.5	.5		0	0	1	1	.3	0/2					
e. Combat Support (including NBC & Radio Electronic Combat (REC))	CPT	SL	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	2		3	3	2	2	3	2/3	1	1	2	CACDA	
	HRS(S)	8	2	16	3	2	0	4	14	3	1.5		1	1	5	1.5	2	5/5	1	1	.5		
	HRS(P)	8	2	4	2	2	0	3	14	1.5	1.5		0	0	1	1	2	5/5					
f. Special Operations	LT	SL	3	2	1	2	3	3	3	2	3		3	4	2	3	4	4/3	2	2	2	CACDA	
	HRS(S)	1	10	8	1	1	3	3	1	4	1		0	0	3	2	0	0/2	1	1	1		
	HRS(P)	1	7	1	1	1	3	3	0	.5	.5		0	0	1	1	0	0/1					
g. Special Operations	CPT	SL	3	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2		3	3	2	2	3	3/3	1	1	1	CACDA	
	HRS(S)	7	24	16	2	2	5	4	10	6	3		1	1	4	2	1	1/2	2	2	2		
	HRS(P)	7	20	4	2	1	4/1c	3	10	2	2		0	0	1	1	0	1/1					
h. Special Operations	LT	SL	3	2	1	3	3	3	3	2	3		3	3	3	3	4	4/3	2	2	2	CACDA	
	HRS(S)	1	2	8	1	1	.5	2	1	1	1		0	1	1	1	0	0/1	1	1	1		
	HRS(P)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0		0	0	1	1	0	0/0					
i. Special Operations	CPT	SL	3	2	1	2	3	2	1	2	2		3	3	2	2	3	3/3	1	1	1	CACDA	
	HRS(S)	4	2	16	1	2	.5	4	12	1	1		1	1	2	2	1	1/2	2	2	2		
	HRS(P)	4	2	.2	0	.5	0	1	12	0	1		0	0	1	1	0	0/2					

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3. Organizational Basics:

a. Leadership

LT	IN	AR	FA	AU	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWp	CA	CS	CSS
SL	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	2 ^h	1	2	1	2	2	2/2	1	1	1
HRS(S)	40	24	7	28	25	40	80	34	20	29	100	.40	40	34	10	10	73/35	30	30	30
HRS(P)	34	21	3	28	32	40	24	34	20	19	100	30	12	31	5	5	73/10			

CPT	IN	AR	FA	AU	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWp	CA	CS	CSS
SL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1 ^h	1	1	1	2	1	2/2	1	1	1
HRS(S)	80	40	55	24	25	36	80	30	8	32	100	40	16	46	7	40	65/5	50	50	50
HRS(P)	45	40	32	20	28	36	32	30	24	28		71	41	45	5	40	65/5			

b. Organization and Preparation for Combat

LT	IN	AR	FA	AU	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWp	CA	CS	CSS
SL	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	3/2	2/2	2/2	2/2
HRS(S)	4	24	1	8	2	21	10	4	6	2	2	2	1	14	6	2	1/8	4/24	4/f	4/f
HRS(P)	2	24	0	5	2	21	6	4	3	.5		2	2	8	1	2	1/2			

c. Command and Control and Communications (C³)

(1) Staff Procedures in Combat

LT	IN	AR	FA	AU	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWp	CA	CS	CSS
SL	3	3	3	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	3/2	2	2	2
HRS(S)	3	8	1.5	4	2	7	4	6	4	2	2	6	6	9	3	2	1/5	10	10	10
HRS(P)	2	2	0	4	0	7	1	6	1	1		2	2	1	1	2	1/0			

CPT	IN	AR	FA	AU	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWp	CA	CS	CSS
SL	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2/2	1	1	1
HRS(S)	16	6	59	2	6	2	6	10	8	5		4	16	17	4	3	7/10	15	15	15
HRS(P)	20	6	59	2	13	0	1	10	30	5		0	0	1	1	2	7/10			

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(2) Plans, Orders, Graphics, Records, and Reports

IN AR	FA	AD EN	SC	MP MI	CM	UD MW ¹	AG	F I	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CS5	CGSC
SL 2 2	2 2	2 2	3	2 3	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 3/2	2 2	2 2	2 2	
HRS(S) 10 20	1.5	4 10	10	16 5	10 4	4	1 8	9 5	3 3	1 10	3 1/10	1/10	12	12	12	
HRS(P) 6 20	2	4 2	10	8 5	3 2	2	0 0	0 4	4 3	3 1/10						

(3) Decision Making

IN AR	FA	AD EN	SC	MP MI	CM	UD MW ¹	AG	F I	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CS5	CGSC
SL 2 1	2 2	1 2	2	1 1	1 1	1 1	2 2	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 2/2	1 2/2	1 1	1 1	1 1	
HRS(S) 15 16	59	3 10	4/25	16 8	10 6	6	2 2	4 16	5.5 2	4 4/3	2 4/3		12	12	12	
HRS(P) 14 16	59	4 3	2	10 8	30	6	2 3	3 4	2 2	2 4/3						

(4) Command and Control Communications (C2)

IN AR	FA	AD EN	SC	MP MI	CM	UD MW ¹	AG	F I	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CS5	CGSC
SL 2 2	1 1	1 2	2	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 2	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 3/2	1 3/2	1 1	1 1	1 1	
HRS(S) 12 3	59	4 2	2	6 3	5 4	4	1 8	13 5	2 2	2 2/2	2 2/2	2 2/2	8	8	8	
HRS(P) 12 3	59	4 0	0	2 3	5	4	18 125	0 3	1 1	1 0/1						

4. Tactical Basics:

a. Battlefield Movement (Marches, Maneuver)

IN AR	FA	AD EN	SC	MP MI	CM	UD MW ¹	AG	F I	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CS5	CGSC
SL 1 2	2 2	2 2	3	2 3	2 2	2 2h	2 2	2 2	2 2	2 3	3 4/3	1/2	1/2	1/2	2/3	
HRS(S) 40 8	.9	2 6	4b	12 2	4 4	8 12	3 3	9 3.5	1 1	0 1/12	0 1/12	40/8	40/8	40/8	20/8	
HRS(P) 24 8	2	1 3	0	9 2	4 2	2 12	0 0	0 1	1 0	0 1/12						

b. Tactical Intelligence

IN AR	FA	AD EN	SC	MP MI	CM	UD MW ¹	AG	F I	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CS5	CGSC
SL 2 2	3	2 3	3	2 3	2 2	2 3	3 3	3 3	2 3	3 4/2	3 4/2	3 3	3 3	3 3	4 4	
HRS(S) 6 2	1.7	2 1	0	2 3	2 1	1 0	1 1	1 3	3 1	1 0/2	1 0/2	1 1	1 1	1 1	0 0	
HRS(P) 4 2	1.7	4 1	0	1 1	1 0	0	0 0	0 1	1 1	0 0/2						

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SUBJECTS		BRANCH SCHOOLS														PROPOSEMENT					
		IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM	AG	F	TC	MS	AW	CP	CA	CS	CSS
c. Operational Security	LT	SL	2 2	2	2 3	2	2	2 3	2	2	2	2	2 2	2 2	2 2	1 4/2	1	1	1	CGSC	
	SL	2 2	.9	2 1	0	1	1	3 1	2	.5	2	2	0 0	1 2	1 0/2	4	3	4			
	HRS(S)	3 4		2 1																	
	HRS(P)	2 4	.9	2 2				1 1	2	.5	2	2	0 0	1 2	1 0/2	4	3	4			
d. Passage of Lines	CPT	SL	2 1	2	1 3	2	2	1 1	1	2	2	2	2 2	2 2	2 2	1	1	1	CGSC		
	SL	2 1	2	2 1	3	3	3	4 3	3	1	2	2	2 2	2 2	2 2	4	2	4			
	HRS(S)	15 6	2	2 1	0	2	0	3 3	3	3	3	3	0 0	1 3	1 2	4	2	4			
	HRS(P)	15 6	2	2 0				3 3	3	3	3	3	0 0	1 3	0 2	4	2	4			
e. River Crossing	LT	SL	2 2	3	3 1	3	3	2 3	2	4	4	4	4 3	3 2	3 4/3	2/2	2/2	3/3	IN/AR/EN		
	SL	2 2	3	3	3 1	3	3	2 3	2	4	4	4	4 3	3 2	3 4/3	2/2	2/2	3/3	IN/AR/EN		
	HRS(S)	4 3	.5	1 20	0	0	0	4 0	2	0	0	0	0 0	2 2	1 0/1	4/3/4	4/3/4	1/f/1			
	HRS(P)	2 0	0	1 10	0	0	0	2 0	0	0	0	0	0 0	2 0	0 0/1	4/3/4	4/3/4	1/f/1			
f. Operations During Periods of Limited Visibility/Night Operations	CPT	SL	2 2	1	1 1	3	3	1 1	1	2	3	3	4 3	2 2	3 3/3	2/2/2	2/2/3	3/3/3	IN/AR/EN		
	SL	2 2	1	1	1 1	3	3	1 1	1	2	3	3	4 3	2 2	3 3/3	2/2/2	2/2/3	3/3/3	IN/AR/EN		
	HRS(S)	7 4	5	6 25	2	6	2	6 2	3	.5	0	1	2 2	1 1/1	7/4/16	7/f/8	1/f/2				
	HRS(P)	7 0m	5	4 29	2	2	2	2 2	1	0	0	0	0 0	0 0	0 1/0	7/4/16	7/f/8	1/f/2			
g. Patrolling	CPT	SL	2 1	2	2 2	3	3	1 1	1	1	1	1	3 3	2 2	1 3/3	2/1	2/2	3/3	IN/AR		
	SL	2 1	2	2	2 2	3	3	1 1	1	1	1	1	3 3	2 2	1 3/3	2/1	2/2	3/3	IN/AR		
	HRS(S)	40 8	.4	10 6	.5	4	2	14	1	1	1	1	2 2	8 3	1 2/1	40/8	40/f	15/f			
	HRS(P)	20 6	.4	0 5	0	2	2	.5	0	0	0	0	1 2	0 2/0	2/0	40/8	40/f	15/f			
h. Operations During Periods of Limited Visibility/Night Operations	LT	SL	1 2	3	2 3	3	3	1 1	1	2	2	2	2 2	2 2	3 4/4	1	2	3	IN		
	SL	1 2	3	2 3	3	3	3	1 1	1	2	2	2	2 2	2 2	3 4/4	1	2	3	IN		
	HRS(S)	75 0	.2	2 8	0	12 15	4	16	1	1	1	1	4 2	12 8	4 0/0	75	40	4			
	HRS(P)	65 0	0	0 8	0	12 19	6	12	6	12	6	12	0 0	0 4	0/0	75	40	4			
i. Operations During Periods of Limited Visibility/Night Operations	CPT	SL	2 2	3	3 3	3	3	1 1	1	2	2	2	2 2	2 2	3 4	2	2	3	IN		
	SL	2 2	3	3	3 3	3	3	1 1	1	2	2	2	2 2	2 2	3 4	2	2	3	IN		
	HRS(S)	1 2	.2	2 8	0	12 15	4	16	1	1	1	1	4 2	12 8	4 0/0	75	40	4			
	HRS(P)	1.5	.1	2 3	0	12 19	6	12	6	12	6	12	0 0	0 4	0 0	75	40	4			

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5. Offensive Operations:

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OD	MW ¹	AG	F1	QM	IC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS
a. Concepts and Fundamentals																				
LT	SL	1	2	1 ^h	2	2	3	3	2	3	3 ^h	1	3	2	2	3	4/3	1/2	1/2	2/2
	HRS(S)	12	10	15	1	2	1	4	5	3	5	2	2	4	4.5	1	0/2	12/10	12/4	6/3
	HRS(P)	8	8	10	1	1	1	4	6	3	1	5	0	0	0	3	1	0/.2		
CPT	SL	1	1	1 ^h	2	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	2	3	2	1/1	1/2	2/2
	HRS(S)	8	6	22	2	4	5	6	3	4	5	5	4	2	5	2.5	1	8/6	8/6	4/4
	HRS(P)	8	6	16	2	3	0	6	3	10	5	0	0	0	3	3	1			
b. Movement to Contact																				
LT	SL	1	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	4/3	1/2	1/3	3/3
	HRS(S)	12	10	1	1	1	0	2	3	.5	.5	0	1	2	2	.2	0/2	12/10	12/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	8	8	1	1	0	1	1	.2	.5	.5	0	0	0	3	0	0/.2			
CPT	SL	1	1	2	2	3	1	1	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	2	1/1	1/2	3/3
	HRS(S)	8	4	4	2	2	.5	4	3	1	.5	0	1	4	1.5	.3	1	8/4	8/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	8	4	4	2	2	0	3	3	.5	.5	0	0	0	3	0	.3			
c. Meeting Engagement																				
LT	SL	1	2	3	3	3	4	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	4/3	1/2	1/3	3/3
	HRS(S)	8	10	1	1	1	0	1	.5	.5	.5	0	1	2	2	.2	0/2	8/10	8/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	6	8	1	1	0	0	1	.2	.5	.5	0	0	0	3	0	0/.2			
CPT	SL	1	1	2	2	3	4	1	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	2/3	1/1	1/2	3/2
	HRS(S)	8	8	4	2	2	.5	3	1	.5	.5	0	1	3	1.5	.3	1/1	8/8	8/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	8	4	4	2	.5	0	3	.5	.5	.5	0	0	0	3	0	2/1			
d. Hasty Attack																				
LT	SL	1	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	2	3	4/3	1/2	1/3	3/3
	HRS(S)	12	10	1	1	1	0	2	1	.5	.5	2	1	2	2	.2	0/2	12/10	12/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	8	8	1	1	1	1	1	.2	.5	.5	0	0	0	3	0	0/.2			
CPT	SL	1	1	2	2	3	1	1	2	3	3	2	3	2	2	3	2	1/1	1/2	3/3
	HRS(S)	8	12	8	2	2	.5	2	3	1	.5	2	1	3	2	.3	1	8/12	8/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	8	8	8	2	2	0	1	.5	.5	.5	0	0	0	3	0	.3			
e. Deliberate Attack																				
LT	SL	1	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	4/3	1/2	1/2	3/3
	HRS(S)	12	10	1	1	1	0	4	1	.5	.5	1	1	2	2	.2	0/2	12/10	12/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	8	8	1	1	1	0	2	1	.5	.5	0	0	0	3	0	0/.2			
CPT	SL	1	1	2	2	3	1	1	2	3	3	2	3	2	2	3	2	1/1	1/2	3/3
	HRS(S)	8	12	8	2	2	.5	2	3	1	.5	2	1	3	2	.3	1	8/12	8/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	8	8	8	2	2	0	1	.5	.5	.5	0	0	0	3	0	.3			
SL	1	1	1	2	2	3	1	1	2	3	3	2	3	2	2	3	2/3	1/1	1/2	3/3
HRS(S)	12	56	2	2	3	3	.5	4	1	.5	.5	1	1	4	2	.3	1/1	12/56	1/f	2/f
HRS(P)	12	56	2	2	4	0	1	3	.5	.5	.5	0	0	4	3	0	.3/.3			

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		IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM ¹	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS	
f. Exploitation	LT	SL	4	n/a	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	4	4	4	3	2	3	4/3	4/n	2/3	2/3	IN/AR
		HRS(S)	0		1	1	0	.5	1	.5	.5	0	0	0	2	2	.2	0/2	0	8/f	6/f	
		HRS(P)	0		1	0	0	.5	1	.2	.5	0	0	0	0	3	0	0/2				
9. Pursuit	CPT	SL	3	2	2	3	3	2	1	2	3	4	3	2	2	2	3	2/3	3/2	2/3	2/3	IN/AR
		HRS(S)	4	2	2	1	.5	.5	3	1	.5	0	1	2	1.5	.3	.3	1/1.5	4/2	8/f	8/f	
		HRS(P)	4	1	2	.3	0	.5	1	.2	.5	0	0	0	0	3	0	.3/.3				
h. Relief of Encircled Forces	LT	SL	4	n/a	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	4	4	3	2	2	3	4/3	4/n	2/3	2/3	IN/AR
		HRS(S)	0		1	1	0	0	1	1	.5	0	0	0	2	2	.2	0/2	0	6/f	6/f	
		HRS(P)	0		0	0	0	0	1	1	.2	0	0	0	0	3	0	0/2				
i. Reconnaissance in Force	CPT	SL	3	k	2	3	3	2	1	2	3	4	3	2	2	2	3	2/3	3/k	2/3	2/3	IN/AR
		HRS(S)	3		1	1	.5	1	3	1	.5	0	1	3	1.5	.3	.3	2/5	3	8/f	8/f	
		HRS(P)	3		0	.3	0	0	3	.5	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	2/5				
j. Deception Operations (Feints, Ruses, Raids)	LT	SL	4	n/a	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	4	4	3	2	2	3	4/3	4/n	2/3	2/3	IN/AR
		HRS(S)	0		1	1	0	0	1	1	.5	0	0	0	3	1.5	.2	0/2	0	10/f	4/f	
		HRS(P)	0		0	0	0	.5	1	.2	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0/2				

SUBJECTS

BRANCH SCHOOLS

PRO-POONENT

6. Defensive Operations:

a. Concepts and Fundamentals

[illegible]

(1) Covering Force Area

LT	SL	1	2	3	3	2	2	3	2 ^h	2	3	3	4/3	1/2	1/2	2/2	IN/AR
	HRS(S)	1	4	15	2	1	0	2	5	1	1	3	0/2	1/4	1/f		
	HRS(P)	1	4	10	2	1	2	1	5	0	1	0	0/5				

(2) Main Battle Area

[illegible]

(3) Rear Area

[illegible]

b. Defense in Sector

LT	SL	1	2	3	3	3	2	2	3	2	3	4/3	1/2	1/3	3/3	IN/AR
IRS(S)	8	4	2	1	0	.5	2	4	1	0	3	1	8/4	8/f	4/f	
IRS(P)	8	4	2	.5	0	.5	2	.2	0	0	0	0/2				
CPT	SL	1	1	1	3	2	1	1	3	2	2	3	1/1	1/2	3/3	IN/AR
	IRS(S)	9	28	4	5	1	5	4	1	1	6	.3	9/28	9/f	4/f	
	IRS(P)	9	28	4	8	0	3	.5	1	0	1	1				

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Battle Positions

	IN	AR	FA	AU	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM ¹	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS
(1) Linear	LT	SL	1	2	3	3	3	2	2	4	2	3	3	3	2	3	4/3	1/2	1/3	3/3
		HRS(S)	6	8	2	2	0	1	2	0	1	1	4	1.5	.5	0/5	6/8	6/8	6/8	2/3
		HRS(P)	3	4	2	1	0	.5	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0/0				
	CPT	SL	1	2	2	3	3	2	1	3	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	1/2	1/3	3/3
		HRS(S)	4	2	2	4	0	.5	5	2	.5	1	1	3	1	.5	.5	4/2	4/3	2/3
		HRS(P)	4	0	2	2	0	.5	3	.1	.5	0	0	0	1	0	0		4/3	2/3
(2) In-Depth	LT	SL	1	2	3	3	3	2	2	4	2	3	3	2	2	3	4/3	1/2	1/3	3/3
		HRS(S)	6	8	2	2	.5	1.5	2	1	0	1	1	4	1.5	.5	0/5	6/8	6/8	2/3
		HRS(P)	3	4	2	1	.5	1.5	1	.5	0	0	0	0	1	0	0/0			
	CPT	SL	1	1	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	3	1/1	1/3	3/3
		HRS(S)	4	50	2	4	0	4	5	2	.5	1	1	3	1	.5	.5	4/50	4/3	2/3
		HRS(P)	4	50	2	8	0	4	3	.1	.5	0	0	0	1	0	0		4/3	2/3
(3) Perimeter	LT	SL	1	2	2	3	3	2	2	4	2	2	2	2	2	3	4/3	1/2	1/3	3/3
		HRS(S)	6	8	2	2	1	8	2	1	0	1	4	15	2	.5	0/5	6/8	6/8	2/3
		HRS(P)	3	4	2	1	1	4	1	.2	0	0	0	2	1	0	0/0			
	CPT	SL	1	1	2	3	3	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	1/1	1/3	3/3
		HRS(S)	4	4	2	4	1	16	5	2	6	1	4	13	2	.5	.5	4/4	4/3	2/3
		HRS(P)	4	1	1	1	0	6	3	.1	6	0	0	3	1	0	0		4/3	2/3
d. Strong Points	LT	SL	1	2	3	3	3	2	2	3	2	3	3	2	2	3	4/3	1/2	1/3	3/3
		HRS(S)	2	4	2	2	0	.5	2	1	.5	1	1	2	1	.5	0/5	2/4	2/3	2/3
		HRS(P)	1	4	0	1	0	.5	2	.1	.5	0	0	0	1	0	0/0			
	CPT	SL	1	1	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	3	3	2	2	3	3	1/1	1/3	3/3
		HRS(S)	4	1	1	4	0	.5	5	2	.5	1	1	2	1.5	.5	.5	4/1	4/3	2/3
		HRS(P)	1	1	2	2	0	.5	3	.1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		4/3	2/3
e. Counterattack	LT	SL	1	2	3	3	3	2	2	4	2	3	3	2	2	3	4/3	1/2	1/3	3/3
		HRS(S)	4	4	1	1	0	1	2	2	0	1	1	3	1	.5	0/5	4/4	4/3	2/3
		HRS(P)	2	4	0	0	0	0	1	.2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0/0		4/3	2/3
	CPT	SL	1	1	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	3	3	2	2	3	3/3	1/1	1/3	3/3
		HRS(S)	6	4	2	2	0	1	5	1	.5	1	1	2	1	.5	1/5	6/4	6/3	2/3
		HRS(P)	2	4	1	0	0	0	3	.5	0	0	0	1	1	0	1/0		6/3	2/3

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f. Breakout/Linkup

IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM ¹	AG	F1	QM	IC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CS
LT	SL	2	3	2	3	3	2	2	4		3	3	3	2	3	4/3	2/3	2/3	3/3
	HRS(S)	4	1	15	1	1	2	2	0		1	1	3	1	.5	0/5	4/1	4/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	2	0	10	0	0	2	.2	0		0	0	0	1	0	0/0			

CPT	SL	1	2	2	3	2	1	2	3		3	3	2	2	3	3	1/2	1/2	3/3
	HRS(S)	6	4	1	2	0	1	5	.5		1	1	3	1.5	.5	.5	6/4	6/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	2	4	1	.3	0	0	3	.2		0	0	0	1	0	0			

9. C3 Options
Once the Battle
Begins

LT	SL	1	3	2	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	3	4/4	1	1	1
	HRS(S)	4	2	15	1	2	0	2	3		1	1	4	1.5	.5	0/0	12	12	12
	HRS(P)	4	2	10	1	0	2	2	0		0	0	0	1	0	0/0			

CPT	SL	1	1	1	2	3	2	1	2	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	1	1	1
	HRS(S)	4	4	4	2	4	1	2	5		1	1	4	2	.5	1	8	8	8
	HRS(P)	4	4	4	.3	0	2	3	1		0	0	0	1	0	0			

7. Retrograde Operations:

a. Disengagement

LT	SL	1	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	3	4/3	1/2	1/3	3/3
	HRS(S)	8	8	.5	1	1	.1	5	.5		0	0	0	3	.5	0/5	8/8	8/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	4	4	0	1	0	.2	0	.2		0	0	0	.5	0	0/0			

CPT	SL	1	1	3	2	3	3	1	2	3	4	3	2	2	3	3	1/1	1/3	3/3
	HRS(S)	4	4	8.4	2	4	1	5	.5		0	1	3	1	.5	.5	4/4	4/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	3	4	.1	2	.5	0	0	.2		0	0	0	1	0	.5			

b. Delay

LT	SL	1	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	4	3	3	3	3	4/3	1/2	1/2	3/3
	HRS(S)	8	4	.5	2	3	.3	5	2		0	1	3	1	1	0/5	8/4	6/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	4	4	0	1	0	.3	0	.2		0	0	0	.5	.3	0/3			

CPT	SL	1	1	2	2	3	3	2	1	2	4	3	2	2	3	3	1/1	1/2	3/3
	HRS(S)	15	4	8.4	1	4	1	5	1		0	1	4	1	1	.5	15/4	8/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	13	0	4	1	8	0	.5	.2		0	0	0	1	.3	.5			

c. Withdrawal

LT	SL	1	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	4	3	3	3	3	4/3	1/2	1/3	3/3
	HRS(S)	8	4	.5	2	2	.3	5	2		0	1	2	1.5	1	0/5	8/4	4/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	4	4	1	1	0	.3	0	.2		0	0	0	.5	.3	0/3			

CPT	SL	1	1	3	2	3	3	2	1	2	3	3	2	2	3	3	1/1	1/3	3/3
	HRS(S)	4	4	8.4	2	2	1	5	1		1	1	3	1	1	.5	4/4	4/f	2/f
	HRS(P)	4	0	.5	2	2	0	.5	.2		0	0	0	1	.3	.5			

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CSS

d. Retirement

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OD	MMI	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AVP	CA	CS	CSS	IN/AR
LI																					
SL	4	2	3	3	3	3	a	3	2	3		4	3	3	3	3	4/3	4/2	3/3	3/3	
HRS(S)	0	4	.5	1	2	.3		2	.2	.5		0	1	2	1.5	1	0/5	0/4	2/1	2/1	
HRS(P)	0	2	0	0	0	.3		0	.2	.2		0	0	0	.5	.3	0/3				
CPT																					
SL	3	2	3	3	3	3	a	1	2	3		4	3	2	3	3	3	3/2	3/3	3/3	IN/AR
HRS(S)	1	1	8.4	1	1	1		5	5	.7		0	1	3	1	1	.5	1/1	2/1	2/1	
HRS(P)	0	0	.2	1	1	0		3	.2	.7		0	0	0	1	.3	.5				

8. Cavalry Operations (Air and Ground):

a. Concepts and Fundamentals

LI	SL	3	2	3	3	3	3	4	2	4	2	3	3	3	3	3	4/2	2	2	2	AR
HRS(S)	1	8	5	.5	1	0	2	0	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0/3	8	4	3	
HRS(P)	1	4	.5	.5	0	0	0	0	.1	0	1	0	0	0	.5	0	0/3				
CPT	SL	3	1	2 ^h	2	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	3	2/3	1	2	2	AR
HRS(S)	1	2	9	.5	2	1	2	2	2	.2	3 ^h	1	1	3	1	1	2/2	2	6	4	
HRS(P)	1	1	6	0	.5	0	.5	2	.2	.2		0	0	1	1	0	1/2				

b. Reconnaissance

LI	SL	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	2	4	2	4	4	3	3	3	4/2	2	3	3	AR
HRS(S)	0	24	5	.3	1	0	10	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0/4	24	3	3	
HRS(P)	0	24	.5	.3	0	0	4	0	.1	0		0	0	0	.5	0	0/2.5				
CPT	SL	4	1	2	2	3	1	2	2	2	3	4	3	2	2	3	2/3	1	2	3	AR
HRS(S)	0	14		.5	1	0	6	2	2	.2		1	1	2	1	1	2/1	14	2	3	
HRS(P)	4	14		.5	.3	0	4	2	0	.2		0	0	1	1	0	1/1				

c. Security

LI	SL	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	2	4	2	4	4	3	3	3	4/2	2	3	3	AR
HRS(S)	0	16	5	.3	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0/2	16	3	3	
HRS(P)	0	16	.5	.3	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	.5	0	0/1.5				
CPT	SL	4	1	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	3	4	3	2	2	3	2/3	1	2	3	AR
HRS(S)	0	16		.5	1	0	1	2	1	.2		0	1	2	1	1	2/1	16	2	3	
HRS(P)	4	16		.5	.3	0	0	2	0	.2		0	0	1	1	0	1/1				

d. Economy of Force

LI	SL	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	2	4	2	4	4	3	3	3	4/2	2	3	3	AR
HRS(S)	0	16	5	.3	1	0	1	0	.5	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0/2	16	3	3	
HRS(P)	0	8	.3	.3	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	.5	0	0/5				
CPT	SL	4	1	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	3	4	3	2	2	3	3/3	1	2	3	AR
HRS(S)	0	4		.5	1	0	1	2	1	.2		0	1	2	1	1	2/1	4	2	3	
HRS(P)	4	4		.5	.5	0	0	2	0	.2		0	0	1	1	0	0/0				

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROFICIENTe. Operations of
Divisional
Cavalry
(Division 86)

IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MW ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AW ²	CA	CS	CSS	AR
LT	SL	4	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
HR(S)	HR(S)	0	2	5	.5	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	.5/2	2	f	f	f
HR(P)	HR(P)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5	0	.5/1				

f. Covering force

CPT	SL	4	2	3	3	4	3	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	2	3	3	AR
HR(S)	HR(S)	0	2	.5	1	0	1	2	2	.5	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	f	f	
HR(P)	HR(P)	4	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1				
LT	SL	4	2	3	3	3	3	4	2	4	3	3	3	3	3	4/2	2	2	3	AR
HR(S)	HR(S)	0	2	5	.3	2	0	0	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	0/4		f	f	
HR(P)	HR(P)	0	1	0	0	0	.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5	0	0/5				
CPT	SL	4	1	2	2	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	3	2/3	1	2	3	AR
HR(S)	HR(S)	0	40	1	4	0	2	2	2	.5	1	1	5	1	1	7/1	40	f	f	
HR(P)	HR(P)	4	40	0	2	0	1.5	2	2	.5	0	0	4	1	0	7/0				

9. Special Military Operations:

a. Military
Operations
In Urban Terrain

LT	SL	1	2	1	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	4/3	1	1	2	IN
HR(S)	HR(S)	15	4	1	1	1	0	10	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	0/2	15	15	4	
HR(P)	HR(P)	11	0	0	0	1	4	2	0	.5	2	0	0	2	0	0/5				
CPT	SL	1	1	1	2	2	3	1	2	3	2	3	2	1	3	3	1	1	2	IN
HR(S)	HR(S)	27	4	.6	1	3	0	8	4	.5	2	2	1	1	1	1	27	27	4	
HR(P)	HR(P)	27	4	1.7	0	3	0	3	4	1	0	0	0	2	0	0				

b. Rear Area Combat
Operations (RACO)(1) Organization
for Combat

LT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	3	3/3	1/2	4/2	3/2	CGSC/MP
HR(S)	HR(S)	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	.5	1	4	4	1	2	1	.5/2	2/0	0/3	1/3	
HR(P)	HR(P)	0	0	2	0	1	3	0	.5	.5	1	1	0	1	0	.5/1				
CPT	SL	3	2	1	2	3	1	1	2	1 ^h	1	1	1	1	1	3	1/1	3/1	3/1	CGSC/MP
HR(S)	HR(S)	2	.5	37	.5	2	0	3	.5	12	4	4	5	3	1	1	2/0	2/3	2/3	
HR(P)	HR(P)	2	0	37	0	.5	3	3	.2	.5	1	1	0	1	1	0				

SUBJECTS

BRANCH SCHOOLS

PROPONENT

		BRANCH SCHOOLS												PROPONENT								
		IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CS	
(2)	Perimeter Defense	LT	SL	3	2	3	2	3	2	3	3	2		1	2	2	2	3	4/3	1/2	2/2	2/2
		HRS(S)	0	0	.3	2	1	2	10	3	.2	16	4	4	11	4	1	0/1	4/0	8/10	8/10	
		HRS(P)	0	0	.3	2	2	2	5	0	.5	8	2	2	3	1	0	0/0				
(3)	Active/ Passive Security	CPT	SL	3	2	1	1	3	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	3	1/1	2/1	2/1	
		HRS(S)	1	0	.2	.5	2	1	7	5	.5	.5	4	4	6	4	1	1	4/0	8/7	8/7	
		HRS(P)	1	0	.2	0	.3	0	5	4	.1	.5	2	2	3	1	0	0				
(4)	Weapons Employment	LT	SL	3	2	3	2	3	3	2	3	3	1	1	2	2	2	3	4/3	1/2	1/2	
		HRS(S)	0	0	.1	.5	2	1	14	3	.5	4	4	4	11	4	1	0/2	4/2	8/14	8/14	
		HRS(P)	0	0	.1	0	2	1	8.5	0	.5	2	0	0	0	1	0	0/0				
(5)	Physical Layout of Rear Area	CPT	SL	3	2	1	1	3	3	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	3/3	1/1	1/1	1/1	
		HRS(S)	1	.5	.1	.5	2	1	14	5	1	.5	4	4	3	4	1	1/0	6/4	8/14	8/14	
		HRS(P)	1	0	.1	0	6	0	6	3	.1	.5	0	0	0	1	0	0/0				
c. Reconstitution of Ineffective Units	LT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	1	2	2	2	3	4/3	1/2	2/2	2/2	
		HRS(S)	0	2	.1	1	1	0	4	1	.5	2	4	2	10	4	1	0/1	2/4	3/4	4/4	
		HRS(P)	0	0	.1	0	1	0	.5	0	.5	0	0	0	3	1	0	0/0				
	CPT	SL	3	2	3	2	3	3	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	3/3	1/2	2/2	2/2	
		HRS(S)	2	2	.2	1	1	1	4	4	1	3	4	4	4	4	1	1/0	4/4	3/2	4/2	
		HRS(P)	2	2	.2	0	.5	0	.5	4	.1	2	0	0	8	1	0	0/0				
	LT	SL	4	2	2	2	4	4	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	4/4	3	2	2	
		HRS(S)	0	1	6	1	0	0	1	3	.5	2	1	1	2	3	0	1	1	2	2	
		HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0/0				
	CPT	SL	4	2	1	1	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	1	2	3	3	4/3	2	1	1	
		HRS(S)	0	2	3	2	1	1	1	3	1	2	1	4	2	1	1	0/2	4	4	4	
		HRS(P)	0	0	.2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0/0				

SUBJECTS

BRANCH SCHOOLS

PROPORTION

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SUBJECTS	CPT	SL	HRS(S)	HRS(P)	IN	AR	FA	AU	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OD	MM	AG	FI	QM	IC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS	IMA
d. Counterinsurgency Operations	LT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	4	2	3	3	4	4	2	3	3	4/3	3	3	3	IN
		HRS(S)	0	0	5	0	5	.5	1	0	8	0	1	2	1	0	0	3	1	1	0/5	0	4	2	
		HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0/0				
e. Counterterror Operations	CPT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3/3	3	3	3	IN
		HRS(S)	8	.5	3	0	1	2	.3	0	8	3	1	0	2	1	1	2	1	1	.5/2	4	4	2	
		HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0/2				
f. Special Forces Operations	LT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	4	4	2	3	3	4/3	3	3	3	IMA
		HRS(S)	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	3	.5	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0/5	1	1	1	
		HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0/0				
g. Foreign Internal Defense	CPT	SL	3	4	3	4	3	4	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	3/3	2	2	2	IMA
		HRS(S)	0	0	1	0	1	0	.5	0	1	5	1	0	2	0	0	1	1	1	.5/2	2	2	2	
		HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0/2				
h. Unconventional Warfare	LT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	9	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	4/3	3	3	3	IMA
		HRS(S)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0/5	1	1	1	
		HRS(P)	0	0	.1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	.5	0	0/0				
i. Counterinsurgency Operations	CPT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	9	2	2	3	2	4	4	3	3	3	3/3	2	2	2	IMA
		HRS(S)	8	.5	1	0	.5	1	0	1	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	2	1	1	.5/1	2	2	2	
		HRS(P)	0	0	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0/1				

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPORTION

i. Psychological Operations	LT	IN	AR	FA	AD	LN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM ¹	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS	IMA
		SL	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	3	2	4/3	3	3	
	HRS(S)	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	3	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0/5	1	1	1
	HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0/0				
	CPT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	2	4	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	
	HRS(S)	0	.5	1	1	1	0	1	3	1	0	1	0	0	2	1	1	.5	2	2	1	
	HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0				
j. Civil Affairs	LT	SL	3	3	4	3	3	2	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	4/3	3	3	3	
	HRS(S)	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	0/1	1	1	1	
	HRS(P)	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	.1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0/1				
	CPT	SL	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3/3	2	2	3	
	HRS(S)	0	2	2	1	1	2	.5	1	1	0	2	1	1	2	1	1	1/1				
	HRS(P)	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	.2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0/1				
k. Amphibious	LT	SL	3	3	4	3	2	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	4/3	3	2	3	
	HRS(S)	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	5	1	1	0/1	1	8	2	
	HRS(P)	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0/1				
	CPT	SL	3	3	3	3	1	3	3	2	3	3	4	4	2	2	3	3	3	2	3	
	HRS(S)	8	1	2	1	3	2/0 ^c	1	2	2	3	1	0	0	3	3.5	1	1	8	8	2	
	HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	3	0	0				
l. Airborne	LT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	4/3	3	3	3	
	HRS(S)	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	3	1	0	1	0	0	3	1	1	0/1	1	1	2	
	HRS(P)	0	0	0	.5	0	0	0	0	.5	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0/5				
	CPT	SL	3	2	3	2	3	3	1	2	3	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	
	HRS(S)	9	.5	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	.5	2	0	1	5	1	1	.5	9	9	2	
	HRS(P)	0	0	.2	.5	0	0	0	0	.2	.3	2	0	0	0	1	1	0				
m. Airborne	LT	SL	1	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	4/2	1/2	1/3	3/3	
	HRS(S)	20	0	2	1	1	0	2	2	1	0	1	0	0	3	1	1	0/18	20/9	10/4	2/4	
	HRS(P)	16	0	0	.5	0	0	2	2	.5	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0/5				
	CPT	SL	1	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	3	2	3	3	2	3	3	2/3	1/1	1/2	3/2	
	HRS(S)	36	.5	2	1	1	0	2	3	1	.5	2	1	1	2	1	1	5/5	36/16	10/9	2/9	
	HRS(P)	36	0	.2	.5	0	0	2	0	.2	.3	2	0	0	0	1	1	5/0				

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPORTION

n. Ranger

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AVP	CA	CS	CSS	IN
LT																					
SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	2	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	4/3	3	3	3	
HRS(S)	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	1	1	0/5	1	1	1	
HRS(P)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0/0				
CPT																					
SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	IN
HRS(S)	2	.5	2	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	2	1	1	.5	2	1	1	
HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	1	0	0				

10. Considerations for Special Environments:

a. Desert

	LT	SL	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AVP	CA	CS	CSS	IN/AR
LT																						
SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	3h	4	4	3	3	2	4/3	3/3	3/3	3/3	
HRS(S)	1	1	2	.5	1	0	.5	0	2	2	1	1	0	0	.2	1	1	0/1	1/1	1/1	1/1	
HRS(P)	0	0	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0/0				
CPT																						
SL	3	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	1	2	3	2h	4	3	2	3	1	3/3	3/2	3/2	3/2	IN/AR
HRS(S)	7	2	2	1	2	1	.5	0	3	2	0	4	0	1	2	1	1	1/5	7/2	7/2	7/2	
HRS(P)	7	3	.1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	1/0				

b. Jungle

	LT	SL	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AVP	CA	CS	CSS	IN
LT																						
SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3		4	4	3	3	2	4/3	3	3	3	
HRS(S)	1	1	2	.5	1	0	.5	0	2	2	1		0	0	1	1	1	0/1	1	1	1	
HRS(P)	0	0	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0/0				
CPT																						
SL	3	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	1	2	3		4	4	2	3	1	3/3	3	3	3	IN
HRS(S)	7	1.5	2	1	1	0	.5	0	3	2	0		0	0	2	1	1	1/5	7	7	7	
HRS(P)	7	0	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	1/0				

c. Mountain

	LT	SL	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AVP	CA	CS	CSS	IN
LT																						
SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3		4	4	3	3	2	4/3	3	3	3	
HRS(S)	1	1	2	.5	1	0	.5	0	2	1	1		0	0	2	1	1	0/1	1	1	1	
HRS(P)	0	0	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0/0				
CPT																						
SL	3	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	1	2	3		4	4	2	3	1	3/3	3	3	3	IN
HRS(S)	7	1.5	2	1	1	0	.5	0	3	2	0		0	0	2	1	1	1/5	7	7	7	
HRS(P)	9	0	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	1/0				

d. Northern Regions

	LT	SL	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AVP	CA	CS	CSS	IN
LT																						
SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3		4	4	3	3	2	4/3	3	3	3	
HRS(S)	1	1	2	.5	1	0	.5	0	2	1	1		0	0	1	1	1	0/1	1	1	1	
HRS(P)	0	0	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0/0				
CPT																						
SL	3	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	1	2	3		4	4	2	3	1	3/3	3	3	3	IN
HRS(S)	7	1.5	2	1	1	0	.5	0	3	2	0		0	0	2	1	1	1/5	7	7	7	
HRS(P)	9	0	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	1/0				

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPOSER

IN AR FA AD EN SC MP MI CM UD MM AG FI QM IC MS APD CA CS CSS

11. Indirect Fire Support

a. Request and Adjust Indirect Fire

LT	SL	1	2	1	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	1	2	2	2	4	4/2	1	1	1	FA
IRS(S)	15	25	64	1	4	1	12	8	8	1	4	2	4	5.5	0	0/5	14	14	14	0/5	1	1	1	FA	
IRS(P)	8	25	49	1	2	1	12	8	1	1	4	0	0	0	0	0/5				0/5					

CPT	SL	1	1	2	2	2	3	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	4	2/3	1	1	1	FA
IRS(S)	5	18	30	2	4	3	0	12	8	1	4	0	4	2	2	3/5	12	12	12	FA
IRS(P)	5	4	30	2	2	3	0	8	1	8	1.5	0	0	0	0	2/5				

b. Artillery Effects (Shell fuze Combinations)

LT	SL	2	2	1	2	3	3	3	1	3	3	3	3	2	4	4/2	3	3	3	FA
IRS(S)	2	4	3	1	1	1	.5	1	3	6	1	1	1	1	0	0/2	1	1	1	FA
IRS(P)	2	4	3	2	1	.5	1	3	.5	1	1	0	0	0	0	0/1				

c. Organization, Command and Control

LT	SL	2	2	3	3	4	3	2	3	1	3	3	4	3	2	4/3	3	3	3	FA
IRS(S)	1	2	6	2	0	.5	2	3	4	.5	1	0	0	2	1	0/2	1	1	.5	FA
IRS(P)	1	2	6	2	1	.5	1	3	.5	.5	1	0	0	0	0	0/1				

d. Priorities of Support on the Battlefield

LT	SL	3	3	3	2	3	4	3	4	3	3	3	2	2	2	4/3	3	4	4	FA
IRS(S)	1	1	3	1	2	0	0	1	0	2	0	1	1	1	4	1	0/1	0	0	FA
IRS(P)	1	1	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	0	0/5			

e. Land Space Requirements in the MDA and CFA

LT	SL	3	4	3	2	4	4	4	4	3	4	3	4	3	3	4/3	4	4	4	FA
IRS(S)	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0/1	0	0	0	FA
IRS(P)	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0/0				

CPT	SL	2	2	2	1	3	4	4	2	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	FA
IRS(S)	2	1	6	2	.3	0	0	0	2	.2	0	1	1	2	1	1	.5	1	1	FA
IRS(P)	1	1	7.5	2	.3	0	0	0	2	.2	0	0	0	2	1	0				

SUBJECTS

BRANCH SCHOOLS

PROPOONENT

12. Air Defense:

a. Short Range Air Defense Systems (SIRADU)

IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS
LT	SL	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	2	3	3 ^h	3	3	3	3	4/3	2	3	3
HRS(S)	1	2	.5	27	1	.2	2	2	1	1	4	1	1	2	1	0/1	4	2	
HRS(P)	1	.5	.5	27	0	0	0	0	.2	1	4	0	0	0	2	0	0/5		
CPT	SL	2	2	3 ^h	1	3	2	2	2	2	2 ^h	3	3	2	2	3	3/3	2	3
HRS(S)	1	1	4	23	1	0	1	2	1	.5	8	1	1	2	2	1	1/1	4	2
HRS(P)	1	1	4	23	1	0	0	2	.2	0		0	0	0	2	.5	1/0		

AD																			
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b. Man Portable Air Defense Systems

AD																			
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c. Non-Divisional Air Defense Systems

AD																			
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d. Unit Active Air Defense Measures

AD																			
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e. Unit Passive Air Defense Measures

AD																			
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SUBJECTS

SUBJECTS		BRANCH SCHOOLS																			PROFICIENT		
		IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	UD	MM ¹	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS		
f. Visual Aircraft Recognition	LT	SL HRS(S) HRS(P)	3 1 1	2 2 0	3 .1 .1	2 3 3	3 0 0	2 2 1	3 3 0	3 .2 .5	3 1 0	3 1 0	2 2 0	2 2 0	3 2 2	3 2 2	3 2 1	4/2 0/3 0/1	2 3 3	2 3 3	2 3 3		
	CPT	SL HRS(S) HRS(P)	3 1 1	2 2 0	3 1 1	2 1 0	3 0 1	2 2 1	3 1 1	2 1 0	3 .5 0	2 2 0	2 2 0	2 2 0	2 2 2	2 2 0	3 1 2	1/3 2/1 2/1	2 3 4	2 4 4	3 4 4		
	AD																						
g. Priorities of Support on the Extended Battlefield	LT	SL HRS(S) HRS(P)	4 0 0	3 1 .5	3 .1 .1	2 6 6	3 3 0	4 0 0	3 .5 1	3 2 0	3 1 1	3 1 1	4 0 0	4 0 0	3 2 2	2 2 2	2 1 0	4/3 0/1 0/5	2 3 3	2 3 3	2 3 3		
	CPT	SL HRS(S) HRS(P)	3 1 1	2 2 1	3 6 .3	3 1 0	4 0 .5	3 2 2	2 2 2	1 2 .5	2 .5 0	3 1 0	4 1 0	4 0 0	3 2 2	2 2 2	2 1 0	4/3 0/1 0/5	1 6 3	2 3 3	3 3 3		
	AD																						
h. Land Space Requirements in the MBA and CFA	LT	SL HRS(S) HRS(P)	4 0 0	3 .5 .5	3 1 0	2 2 2	4 0 0	4 0 0	3 3 0	3 1 0	4 0 0	4 0 0	4 0 0	4 0 0	3 1 3	3 1 1	3 1 0	4/3 0/5 0/0	2 1 1	2 1 1	2 1 1		
	CPT	SL HRS(S) HRS(P)	3 1 1	2 1 .5	3 2 0	1 2 2	4 0 0	4 0 2	2 2 2	1 2 .2	4 0 0	3 1 0	4 1 0	4 0 0	3 2 2	3 1 1	3 1 0	3 .5 0	1 2 2	1 2 1	2 2 1		
	AD																						
Army Aviation																							
a. Combat Aviation	LT	SL HRS(S) HRS(P)	3 1 1	2 2 2/0e	3 2 0	3 1 1	3 1 0	3 .2 1	3 3 0	2 2 .2	3 1 0	3 ^{3h} 1 1	3 1 0	3 1 0	3 1 1	3 1 1	3 1 1	3/2 1/30 1/18	2 6 6	3 2 2	3 2 2		
	CPT	SL HRS(S) HRS(P)	3 2 2	1 2 1	3 2.5 2.2	2 2 2	3 1 .5	3 1 1	2 2 2	2 3 .2	3 0 0	3 ^{2h} 2 3	3 1 0	3 1 0	3 2 1	3 1 0	3 1 1	1/3 12/1 12/1	1 10 6	2 6 6	2 6 6		
	AV																						
b. Combat Support Aviation	LT	SL HRS(S) HRS(P)	3 1 1	2 .5 0	3 2 0	3 1 1	3 1 0	3 .2 .5	4 0 0	2 1 .1	3 1 0	3 1 0	3 1 0	3 1 0	3 2 3	3 1 0	3 1 1	3/2 1/8 1/6	2 7 3	3 3 3	3 3 3		
	CPT	SL HRS(S) HRS(P)	3 2 2	2 2 .5	3 2.5 2.2	2 2 2	3 1 .5	3 1 1	4 0 0	2 1 .1	3 1 0	3 1 0	3 1 0	3 1 0	3 2 3	3 1 0	3 1 1	3/2 1/8 1/6	2 7 3	3 3 3	3 3 3		
	AV																						

SUBJECTS

BRANCH SCHOOLS

PROPOSENT

c. Combat Service Support Aviation

	IM	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OD	MM ¹	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AV ¹	CA	CS	CSS	AV
LT																					
SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	2	3		3	3	3	3	3	3/2	2	3	3	
HRS(S)	1	.5	2	1	1	.2	1	0	1	1		1	1	4	2.5	1	1/8	7	2.5	2.5	
HRS(P)	1	0	0	1	0	.2	0	0	.1	0		0	0	1	0	1	1/6				
CPT																					
SL	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	2	2	2		3	3	2	2	3	2/3	1	2	2	AV
HRS(S)	1	1	.5	2	1	0	1	1	2	0		1	1	5	2	1	5/1	12	7	7	
HRS(P)	1	.5	2.2	2	.5	0	0	0	.1	0		0	0	0	0	1	5/1				

14. Tactical Nuclear Operations:

a. Nuclear Weapons Effects

	LT	SL	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)
LT																						
SL	3	3	3	3	1	2	3	3	3	1	2	3h	1	3	2	2	2	4/3	2	2	2	FA
IR(S)	1	1.5	.5	16	2	2	1	1	1	30	1	15	2	1	4	3	4	0/3	4	4	4	
IR(P)	1	1.5	.5	8	1	0	1	1	1	3	1	15	0	0	4	2	1	0/10				
CPT																						
SL	2	2	2	1	2	3	2	2	2	2	2h	1	2	2	2	2	1	3/3	1	1	1	FA
IR(S)	8	12	8.4	10	4	6	2	2	3	100	1	44	2	2	4	3	11	3/1	3	3	3	
IR(P)	8	12	8.4	10	4	6	1	1	3	60	1		0	0	4	2	11	3/1				

b. The Nuclear Battle

(1) Planning

	LT	SL	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)
LT																						
SL	3	3	4	2	3	3	4	3	3	1	4	3	4	3	3	4	4/3	4	4	4	4	FA
IR(S)	4	.5	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	10	0	1	0	2	2	0	0/2	0	0	0	0	
IR(P)	1	.5	0	2	2	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	3	0	0/2					
CPT																						
SL	2	2	2	2	2	3	4	2	2	1	3	4	2	2	2	2	3/3	3	3	3	3	FA
IR(S)	4	5	2.5	2	1	6	0	0	2	10	.5	1	0	3	4	6	1/2	1	1	1	1	
IR(P)	2	5	2.5	1	4	6	0	2	2	8	.2	0	0	2	6	0	2/2					

(2) Tactics

	LT	SL	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)
LT																						
SL	3	3	4	2	3	3	4	3	3	2	4	3	4	3	3	4	4/3	4	4	4	4	FA
IR(S)	2	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	5	0	1	0	1	2	0	0/2	0	0	0	0	
IR(P)	1	1	0	0	6	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0/2					
CPT																						
SL	2	1	2	2	2	3	4	2	2	1	3	4	2	2	2	2	3/3	2	3	3	3	FA
IR(S)	10	4	6	1	1	4	1	1	2	10	.5	1	0	2	3	6	1/2	3	1	1	1	
IR(P)	5	4	6	1	4	4	0	2	2	2	.5	0	0	2	2	0	2/2					

c. Nuclear Release and Employment

	LT	SL	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)	IR(S)	IR(P)
LT																						
SL	4	3	3	1	2	3	4	3	4	2	4	3	4	3	3	4	4/3	3	3	4	4	FA
IR(S)	0	.5	.9	1	1	0	1	0	1	5	0	1	0	1	2	0	0/1	1	1	1	0	
IR(P)	0	.5	.2	1	2	0	.5	0	.2	.2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0/1					
CPT																						
SL	3	3	1	1	2	3	3	2	2	1	3	4	3	3	2	3	3/3	2	3	3	3	FA
IR(S)	1	.5	3.2	1	1	4	1	1	1	15	0	1	0	1	2	6	1/2	3	1	1	1	
IR(P)	1	.5	2.5	1	1	4	.5	1	1	24	0	0	0	1	1	1	3/2					

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROFONENT

d. Nuclear Logistics

IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MMT	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CS5
LT	SL	4	4	3	4	3	3	4	2	4	4	4	4	3	4	4/3	4	4	3
	HRS(S)	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0/1	0	0	1
	HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0/1			

e. Reconstitution

CPT	SL	4	3	2	2	3	3	3	4	1	4	4	3	3	3	3/3	3	3	2
	HRS(S)	0	.5	4	1	1	0	1	0	5	0	0	0	1	2	6	1	1	3
	HRS(P)	0	.5	4	1	.3	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1/2			
LT	SL	4	4	4	1	4	3	3	4	2	4	2	3	3	4	4/3	2	2	2
	HRS(S)	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	1	1	0	0/1	6	6	6
	HRS(P)	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0/1			

f. C3 on the Nuclear Battlefield

CPT	SL	4	2	3	1	3	3	2	3	1	3	2	2	3	3	3	1	1	1
	HRS(S)	0	1	.5	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	6	3	3	3
	HRS(P)	0	1	.5	1	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1			
LT	SL	3	3	2	1	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	4	4/3	1	1	1
	HRS(S)	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	2	1	3	2	0	0/1	4	4	4
	HRS(P)	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	.2	0	0	1	1	0	0/1			
CPT	SL	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	3	3	2	2	3	3	1	1	1
	HRS(S)	2	2	1	1	1	4	4	1	5	1	1	4	2	6	1	4	4	4
	HRS(P)	2	0	1	1	1	4	2	1	2	0	0	1	1	0	1			

15. Engineer Operations:

a. Mobility

LT	SL	1	2	3	2	1	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	4	3	4/3	3	3	3
	HRS(S)	2	1	.5	1	125	0	1	1	1	.5	1	1	0	1	0/5	4	4	2
	HRS(P)	1	1	0	1	101	0	.5	1	1	.2	1	0	0	0	0/5			

b. Countermobility

CPT	SL	1	1	3h	2	1	3	3	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	3/3	2	3	3
	HRS(S)	2	2	4	2	25	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	1	1/1	12	4	4
	HRS(P)	2	2	4	2	21	1	.5	1	1	.5	5	0	0	0	0/1			
LT	SL	1	2	3	2	1	4	4	3	2	4	4	4	4	4	4/3	3	3	3
	HRS(S)	5	8	.5	1	75	0	0	1	1	.5	0	0	1	0	0/5	4	4	2
	HRS(P)	1	8	0	1	50	0	0	0	1	.2	0	0	0	0	0/5			
CPT	SL	1	1	1	2	1	4	3	3	1	4	4	3	3	3	3/3	2	3	3
	HRS(S)	7	6	6	2	25	0	0	1	1	.5	0	0	2	1	1/1	12	4	4
	HRS(P)	7	6	6	2	15	0	0	0	1	.5	0	0	0	0	0/1			

SUBJECTS

BRANCH SCHOOLS

PROPOONENT

CA CS CSS

c. Survivability

LT	IN	AR	FA	AU	LN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS	EN
SL	1	2	3	2	1	4	3	3	2	3		4	3	3	4	3	4/3	3	3	3	
HRS(S)	12	2	1	1	50	0	1	1	1	.5		0	2	2	0	1	0/5	4	4	2	
HRS(P)	8	2	0	1	27	0	0	1	0	.2		0	0	2	0	0	0/5				

CPT	SL	1	1	2	1	4	3	3	2	3		4	3	3	3	3/3	2	3	3			
SL																						
HRS(S)																						
HRS(P)																						

d. General Engineering

LT	SL	HRS(S)	HRS(P)	IN	AR	FA	AU	LN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS	EN
SL	3	3	3	2	1	3	3	3	2	3		4	3	3	4	3	3/3	3	3	3				
HRS(S)	1	1	.5	1	1/5	0	1	1	1	1		0	1	1	0	1	.5/5	1	1	2				
HRS(P)	1	1	0	1	152	0	.5	1	.3	.3		0	0	0	0	0	.5/5							

CPT	SL	HRS(S)	HRS(P)	IN	AR	FA	AU	LN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS	EN
	3	2	2	2	1	3	3	3	1	3		4	3	3	3/3	3	3	3						
	1	2	2	2	340	0	1	1	1	2		0	1	1	.5/1	2	2	4						
	1	.2	2	2	300	0	.5	1	.2	.5		0	0	0	0/1									

e. Atomic Demolition Munition (ADM) Operations

LT	SL	HRS(S)	HRS(P)	IN	AR	FA	AU	LN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS	EN
	4	3	3	3	1	4	3	4	2	4		4	4	4	4	4/3	3	3	3					
	0	0	.5	1	6	0	1	0	1	0		0	0	0	0	0/5	2	2	1					
	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	0	.2		0	0	0	0	0/5								
CPT	SL	HRS(S)	HRS(P)	IN	AR	FA	AU	LN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS	EN
	3	3	3	3	1	4	3	4	1	4		4	4	4	4	3/3	3	3	3					
	1	0	0	1	4	0	1	0	5	0		3	1	0	0	.5/1	4	1	1					
	1	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	2	0		0	0	0	0	3/0								

CPT	SL	HRS(S)	HRS(P)	IN
3	3	3	1	3
3	1	4	4	3
3	4	3	0	3
1	4	1	0	3
5	0	0	1	3
0	0	0	0	3
2	0	0	0	3
0	0	0	0	3
0	0	0	0	3
0	0	0	0	3
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16. NBC Warfare:

a. U.S. Policy

LT	SL	3	1	2	1	3	1	3	2	1	3	3	4/3	2	2	2	
	HRS(S)	1	.5	1	1	1	.2	.5	1	2	1	20	0/1	1	1	1	
	HRS(P)	1	.5	.2	1	1	.2	.5	1	2	.2	20	0/1				
	IN																
CPT	SL	3	1	2	1	3	1	3	1	1	2	2h	3	3	2	3	1
	HRS(S)	1	.5	1	1	1	.5	1	2	.5	4	20	1	2	1	1	1
	HRS(P)	1	.5	2.5	1	.5	2	4	2	.2				1.5	1	1	
	CM																

CPT	SL	HRS(S)	HRS(P)	IN	AR	FA	AU	LN	SC	MP	MI	CM											
SL	3	1	2	1	3	1	3	1	1	4		3	3	1	1	1							
HRS(S)	1	.5	1	1	1	2	.5	4	4	.2		0	1	2	1.5	1	1	1	1				
HRS(P)	1	.5	2.5	1	.5	2	.5	4	2	.2		0	0	1	1	1							

b. Threat Policy

LT	SL	HRS(S)	HRS(P)	IN	AR	FA	AU	LN	SC	MP	MI	CM				
3	2	2	1	3	1	2	3	1	3		3	4/3	2	2	2	2
1	.5	.5	1	1	.2	1	1	3	1		0	1	2	1	0/1	2
1	.5	.2	1	0	.2	1	1	1	1		0	0	2	1	1	0/1

CPT	SL	HRS(S)	HRS(P)	IN	AR	FA	AU	LN	SC	MP	MI	CM
SL	3	1	2	1	3	1	2	3	1	3		1
HRS(S)	1	1	2	1	1	1	4	1	1	10		3
HRS(P)	1	1	.5	1	.5	4	1	1	1	2		3

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROFONENT

		IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM1	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AV/p	CA	CS	CSS	
c. Survivability	LT	SL	1	1	1	1	2	3	2	1	1		1	2	2	3	2	4/3	2			CM
	HRS(S)	16	25	40	2	3	.5	32	5	40	18		8	4	4	2	19	0/2	13			
	HRS(P)	8	16	.2	2	6	.5	18	5	30	15		6	8	4	3	19	0/2				
d. Offensive Use	CPT	SL	1	1	1	1	2	3	1	1	1		1	2	2	2	1	3/2	1	1	1	CM
	HRS(S)	15	2	30	1	4	1	46	5	45	26		8	4	4	3.5	2	5/5	12	12	10	
	HRS(P)	10	2	2	1	4	0	32	3	25	15		4	8	4	8	2	5/5				
e. Defensive Use	LT	SL	3	3	3	2	3	4	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3	4/3	2	2	2	CM
	HRS(S)	1	.5	5	1	1	0	1	5	30	.2		2	2	2	1.5	1	0/2	4	4	4	
	HRS(P)	1	.5	.2	1	2	0	0	5	0	0		0	0	1	1	0	0/1				
f. Reconstitution	CPT	SL	3	2	2	2	3	4	3	2	1	3	3	2	2	3	2	3/3	1	1	1	CM
	HRS(S)	1	.5	30	1	2	7	1	5	100	.2		2	4	8	1	3	.5/1	15	15	15	
	HRS(P)	1	.5	4	1	.5	5	0	2	1	.2		0	0	7	1	3	.5/1				
g. NBC Logistics	LT	SL	4	3	2	1	4	3	3	4	1	3	3	3	3	4	3	4/3	2	2	2	CM
	HRS(S)	0	1.5	6	2	0	.5	2	0	5	0		1	4	2	0	1	0/1	2	2	2	
	HRS(P)	0	.5	.1	1	0	.5	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	1	0	0/1				
h. NBC Logistics	CPT	SL	4	1	1	1	3	3	2	3	1	3	3	2	2	4	3	3	1	1	1	CM
	HRS(S)	0	2	3	1	1	2	2	3	10	1		1	4	3	0	1	1	3	3	3	
	HRS(P)	0	1	.2	1	.5	0	0	3	3	0		0	0	0	1	0	1				
i. NBC Logistics	LT	SL	3	3	3	2	4	3	3	4	1	3	3	4	3	3	3	4/3	2/2	2/2	2/2	CM/MM
	HRS(S)	2	1.5	2	1	0	0	1	0	15	3		1	0	2	1	1	0/2	4/2	4/2	4/2	
	HRS(P)	1	.5	.2	0	0	.5	0	0	5	3		0	0	0	1	0	0/2				
j. NBC Logistics	CPT	SL	3	1	3	1	3	3	2	2	1	3	3	4	2	3	3	3/3	1/1	1/1	1/1	CM/MM
	HRS(S)	4	2	3	2	3	3	1	1	30	0		1	0	3	1	1	1/2	4/2	4/2	7/2	
	HRS(P)	4	1	3.4	2	.5	0	.5	1	4	0		0	0	0	1	1	1/2				

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPOONENT

17. Electronic Warfare:

	IN	AR	FA	AU	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM ¹	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AP ²	CA	CS	CSS
a. Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) (Intercepting, Identifying, Analyzing, Locating)																				
LT	SL	3	2	2	3	4	3	4	2	3	3 ^h	4	4	3	3	3	4/3	3	4	4
HRS(S)	2	1	.9	1	0	1	1	0	2	0	3	0	0	1	1	0	0/1	1	0	0
HRS(P)	2	1	.1	1	0	1	0	0	.2	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0/1			
CPT	SL	3	1	2	2	3	3	1	2	3	1 ^h	3	4	3	3	3	3/3	2	4	4
HRS(S)	2	2	.4	6	1	1	1	1	2	.2	9	1	0	2	1	1	1/2	3	0	0
HRS(P)	2	1	.4	6	3	1	1	1	10	.2		0	0	0	1	0	1/1			
b. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM)(Jamming, Electronic Deception)																				
LT	SL	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	4	2	3	4	4	3	3	3	4/3	2	3	3
HRS(S)	1	5	.9	2	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	1	0/1	3	1	1
HRS(P)	1	3	.1	2	1	1	.5	0	.2	1		0	0	0	1	0	0/1			
CPT	SL	2	1	2	2	3	3	3	1	2	3	3	4	3	3	3	3/3	1	2	2
HRS(S)	1	2	1.7	2	1	1	1	1	4	2	.2	1	0	1	1	1	0/1	5	3	3
HRS(P)	1	1	1.7	2	1	1	2	4	.2	.2		0	0	0	1	0	0/1			
c. Signal Security																				
LT	SL	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	4	2	3	3	3	3	2	2	4/3	2/2	3/2	3/2
HRS(S)	6	6	.9	4	2	1	1	0	1	4	4	1	1	3	2	1	0/2	3/3	1/3	1/3
HRS(P)	5	4	.2	4	2	1	1	0	.2	4		2	2	2	3	0	0/2			
CPT	SL	1	1	2	1	3	2	1	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	3/3	1/2	2/2	2/2
HRS(S)	4	3	3.4	4	2	15	4	12	2	1	1	1	1	3	1.5	1	3/2	5/4	3/4	3/4
HRS(P)	4	2	3.4	4	1	15/0c	2	12	2	.2		2	2	2	1	0	3/2			
d. Integrated Operations with Tactics																				
LT	SL	1	2	2	3	4	3	4	2	3	4	4	4	3	3	3	4/3	2	3	3
HRS(S)	10	6	.9	1	0	1	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	3.5	1	0/1	1	1	1
HRS(P)	2	2	0	1	0	1	1	0	.2	0		0	0	0	8	0	0/1			
CPT	SL	1	1	2	2	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	4	3	2	3	3	2	2	2
HRS(S)	2	2	2.5	2	1	3	3	2	2	.2		1	0	1	2	1	1	3	2	2
HRS(P)	5	0	2.5	2	3	3/0c	2	18	2	3		0	0	0	1	0	1			

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18. Intelligence:

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OD	MM ¹	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS
a. Electromagnetic Intelligence																				
LT	SL	4	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3h	4	4	4	3	3	4/3	4	4	4
	HRS(S)	0	1	2	1	1	0	0	.5	1	.2	0	0	0	1	1	0/1	0	0	0
	HRS(P)	0	0	0	1	0	0	.5	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0/0			
CPT	SL	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	1	2	3	4	4	3	3	3	3/3	4	4	4
	HRS(S)	1	1	2	7	1	0	1	10	1	5	0	0	1	1	1	1/1	0	0	0
	HRS(P)	0	1	6	7	.3	0	1	10	.1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0/1			
b. Imagery Intelligence																				
LT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	4	4	4	3	3	4/3	3	4	4
	HRS(S)	1	.5	.5	1	1	0	0	.5	1	.2	0	0	0	1	1	0/1	1	0	0
	HRS(P)	1	0	.1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0/0			
CPT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	4	4	3	3	3	3/3	3	4	4
	HRS(S)	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	3	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1/1	1	0	0
	HRS(P)	1	.5	6	1	.3	0	.5	3	.1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0/1			
c. Human Intelligence																				
LT	SL	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	4/3	2	3	3
	HRS(S)	1	.5	2	1	1	0	2	1	.2	0	1	1	1	1.5	1	0/1	2	1	1
	HRS(P)	1	0	.1	1	1	0	.5	6	.1	0	0	0	1	3	0	0/1			
CPT	SL	2	3	3	2	3	3	2	1	2	3	3	3	2	3	3	3/3	2	3	3
	HRS(S)	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	6	1	0	1	1	2	1.5	1	1/1	2	1	1
	HRS(P)	1	.5	6	1	.3	0	.5	6	.1	0	0	0	1	3	0	0/1			
d. Counterintelligence																				
LT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	4/3	2	3	3
	HRS(S)	1	.5	1	1	1	0	.5	1	.2	1	2	2	2	1	1	0/1	2	1	1
	HRS(P)	1	0	.1	0	0	0	0	0	.1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0/0			
CPT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	3/3	2	3	3
	HRS(S)	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	25	2	0	2	2	2	1	1	1/1	2	1	1
	HRS(P)	1	.5	6	0	.3	0	.5	25	.1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0/1			
e. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield																				
LT	SL	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	4	4	3	4	3	4/3	2	3	3
	HRS(S)	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	.5	0	0	0	1	0	1	0/1	1	1	1
	HRS(P)	1	0	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0/1			
CPT	SL	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	1	2	3	4	4	3	4	3	3/3	2	3	3
	HRS(S)	6	1	3	6	2	0	3	30	2	1	0	0	3	3	1	2/1	1	1	1
	HRS(P)	6	1	2	0	2	0	3	30	2	0	0	0	0	8	0	2/1			

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f. Tactical All
Source
Intelligence
Production and
Management

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	F1	QH	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS	
LT	SL	3	3	4	4	3	3	4	2	4		3	3	3	3	3	4/3	2	3	3	MI
	HRS(S)	1	0	0	0	1	0	.5	0	0		1	1	1	1	2	0/1	1	1	1	
	HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	2	0	0/0				
CPT	SL	2	2	3	2	3	3	1	2	3		4	4	3	3	3	3/3	2	3	3	MI
	HRS(S)	6	1	3	6	2	0	3	30	2		0	0	3	3	1	2/1	1	1	1	
	HRS(P)	6	1	2	0	2	0	2	30	2		0	0	0	8	0	2/1				
19. NATO Interoperability	LT	SL	3	3	3	3	4	3	4	3	2	4	3	3	3	3	4/3	4	4	4	CACDA
	HRS(S)	1	1	2	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	3	3	2	0/1	0	0	0	
	HRS(P)	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0/0				
CPT	SL	3	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	2	4	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	CACDA
	HRS(S)	1	8	5	3	1	3	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	1	3	3	2	2	8	
	HRS(P)	1	4	0	0	1	0	.5	0	0		0	0	0	0	2	2				

20. Combat Service Support:

a. Transportation

(b) Load Planning

(a) Air	LT	SL	2	3	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	2 th	4	4	3	2	2	4/3	3	3	3	TC	
		HRS(S)	4	.5	.5	2	1	0	0	.5	1	.5	1	5	0	0	11	11	2	0/3	10		10
		HRS(P)	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	7	2	0	0/1				
		CPT	SL	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	1	1 th	2	3	2	2	1	3/3	3	3		3
(b) Land	LT	SL	4	2	.5	2	1	0	0	.5	3	18	1	1	8	13	3	5/4	2	2	2	TC	
		HRS(S)	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	39	0	1/0				
		HRS(P)	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	39	0	1/0				
		CPT	SL	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	1	1 th	2	3	2	2	1	3/3	3	3		3
(b) Land	LT	SL	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	1	4	2	2	2	4/3	3	3	3	TC	
		HRS(S)	2	1	1.5	2	1	0	0	.5	1	.5	2	2	0	4	9	2	0/2	5	5		5
		HRS(P)	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0/.5				
		CPT	SL	3	1	3	1	2	3	2	2	1		1	3	1	2	1	3/3	3	3		3
(b) Land	LT	SL	1	2	.6	3	1	0	0	.5	3	1	2	1	8	11	3	1/2	2	2	2	TC	
		HRS(S)	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	1/0				
		HRS(P)	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	1/0				
		CPT	SL	3	1	3	1	2	3	2	2	1		1	3	1	2	1	3/3	3	3		3

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		IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	NW ¹	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AW ² p	CA	CS	CSS	
(c) Sea	LT	SL	4	3	3	3	2	4	3	4	2	2	4	4	3	2	2	4/3	3	3	3	TC
		HRS(S)	0	.5	.5	1	1	0	.5	0	.5	1	0	0	0	1	2	0/2	4	4	4	
		HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0/5				
	CPT	SL	4	2	3	3	2	4	3	2	2	1	4	3	2	2	1	3/3	3	3	3	TC
		HRS(S)	0	2	.5	1	1	0	.5	3	1	2	0	1	3	13	3	.5/2	2	2	2	
		HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	.5/0				
(2) Convoy Operations	LT	SL	3	1	3	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	4/3	2	2	2	TC
		HRS(S)	0	2	.1	1	2	1	14	3	1	2	2	2	7	13	2	0/2	4	4	4	
		HRS(P)	0	0	0	1	4	1	14	0	0	2	0	0	3	20	0	0/5				
	CPT	SL	3	1	3	1	2	3	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	3/3	2	2	2	TC
		HRS(S)	0	2	.2	2	2	1	20	3	3	2	2	4	4	10	3	1/1	1	1	1	
		HRS(P)	0	2	.2	0	0	1	20	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	1/0				
(3) Movement Control	LT	SL	3	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	4	2	2	2	4/3	2	2	2	TC
		HRS(S)	1	1	.1	1	1	0	4	3	1	1	1	1	0	7	7	0/2	2	2	3	
		HRS(P)	1	0	0	1	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0/5				
	CPT	SL	3	1	3	1	3	3	2	2	2	1	2	3	2	2	1	3	2	2	2	TC
		HRS(S)	1	1	.2	2	1	0	4	5	2	3	1	1	4	8	3	1	1	1	1	
		HRS(P)	1	1	.2	0	1	0	4	0	0	4	0	0	4	6	0	0				
(4) Aviation Logistics	LT	SL	4	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	2	3	4	4	3	3	3	3/3	2	2	2	TC
		HRS(S)	0	0	.1	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	3	2.5	2	1/2	2	2	2	
		HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1/1				
	CPT	SL	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	2	2	3	4	4	2	2	3	2/3	2	2	2	TC
		HRS(S)	1	0	.1	1	1	1	0	2	3	0	0	0	6	5.5	3	20/1	1	1	1	
		HRS(P)	1	0	.1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20/0				
Ammunition																						
(1) Support Structure and Requisitioning	LT	SL	3	3	2	3	3	4	3	4	2	3	3	3	2	2	3	4/3	2	2	2	MM
		HRS(S)	1	1	1.7	1	1	0	1	0	2	1	4	1	4	2	2	0/5	4	4	4	
		HRS(P)	1	0	0	0	0	.5	0	1	2	4	0	0	1	1	0	0/0				
	CPT	SL	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	2	2	3	4	4	2	2	3	2/3	2	2	2	TC
		HRS(S)	1	0	.1	1	1	1	0	2	3	0	0	0	6	5.5	3	20/1	1	1	1	
		HRS(P)	1	0	.1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20/0				

SUBJECTS

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PROPOONENT

		IN	AR	FA	AU	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OD	MM ¹	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AW ¹ P	CA	CS	CSS	
(2)	Safety, Storage, and Transportation	LT																				
		SL	2	2	2	2	3	4	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	4/3	2	2	2
		HRS(S)	2	2	1.5	1	0	0	1	1	2	1	8	0	1	1	3.5	1	0/5	6	6	6
		HRS(P)	2	2	0	.5	0	0	1	0	1	8	0	0	0	1	0	0/0				
		CPT	2	1	2	2	3	4	2	2	1	2	1	3	3	2	1	1	3	2	2	1
		SL	1	3	3.4	1	2	0	2	3	3	3	6	1	1	1	2	4	.5			6
		HRS(P)	1	2	3.4	0	1	0	0	0	2	3		0	0	0	0	0	0			
(3)	Supply Rates and DAO Functions	LT																				
		SL	3	3	2	4	3	4	3	4	2	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	4/3	2	2	2
		HRS(S)	1	.5	.5	0	1	0	.5	0	3	1	5	0	0	7	1.5	1	0/5	4	4	4
		HRS(P)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5	1	5	0	0	7	0	0	0/0				
		CPT	3	1	1	2	3	4	3	3	1	2	1	4	4	2	3	3	3	2	2	1
		SL	1	2	.3	2	1	0	.5	1	3	3	4	0	0	4	1.5	2	.5	1	1	4
		HRS(P)	1	1	.2	0	2	0	0	0	1	3		0	0	4	0	0	0			
(4)	Munitions Identification	LT																				
		SL	2	1	2	2	2	3	4	4	2	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	4/3	2	2	2
		HRS(S)	6	2	.5	2	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	0/5			
		HRS(P)	6	2	.5	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0/0					
		CPT	2	1	2	2	2	3	4	3	1	2	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	1
		SL	6	2	.8	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	.5	1	1	2
		HRS(P)	6	2	.8	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0			
(5)	Emergency Destruction Procedures	LT																				
		SL	3	3	2	3	2	4	2	2	2	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	4/3	2	2	2
		HRS(S)	3	1	.7	1	1	0	1	3	2	1	.5	1	0	2	1	1	0/5			
		HRS(P)	3	0	.5	0	0	0	0	0	.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.0				
		CPT	3	2	2	3	2	4	2	1	2	2	4	4	3	3	3	3	4/3	2	2	2
		SL	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	3	2	1	2	0	1	1	1	1	0/5			
		HRS(S)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0			
		HRS(P)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0				
(6)	EOD Operations	LT																				
		SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	2	1	1	3	4	4	3	3	3	4/3	3	3	2
		HRS(S)	1	.5	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0/5	2	2	2
		HRS(P)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	.2	.5	1	0	0	1	8	0	0/0				
		CPT	3	2	2	3	2	4	2	1	1	2	2	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	1
		SL	1	1	2	1	1	0	1	3	3	3	2	0	0	1	1	2	.5	2	2	2
		HRS(S)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0			
		HRS(P)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0				

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPOONENT

c. Maintenance

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM ¹	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AvdP	CA	CS	CSS
(1) Recovery and Evacuation	LT	SL	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	2
		HRS(S)	8	8	1	1	3	.3	1	2	18	2	0	3	6	5.5	3	4	4	18
		HRS(P)	8	8	.1	1	2	.3	0	2	18	2	0	0	0	8	0	.5/1		
	CPT	SL	2	1	3	2	2	3	2	1	1	1	4	3	2	1	3/3	2	2	1
		HRS(S)	1	8	2.2	2	3	2	1	3	6	2	0	1	2	4.2	4	2	3	6
		HRS(P)	1	8	.3	0	1	0/2c	0	2	6		0	0	0	2	0	1/1		
(2) Command and Staff Management of Preventive Maintenance	LT	SL	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	1	2	2	1
		HRS(S)	4	1	3.1	6	2	.7	2	2	4	2	4	1	8	6	3	4	4	4
		HRS(P)	2	1	.5	6	4		2	2	4	2	0	0	8	24	0	1/1		
	CPT	SL	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	2	1	1	1	3	2	1	3/2	1	1	1
		HRS(S)	12	24	8	6	8	0	2	3	3	4	0	4	1	4	6	4	8	3
		HRS(P)	12	24	8	6	8		2	3	4		0	0	3	1	0	2/4		
(3) Repair Parts Supply (PLL)	LT	SL	2	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	1	1	3/3	2	2	2
		HRS(S)	6	8	12	9	2	5	4	6	10	4	0	2	16	8	0	3	3	8
		HRS(P)	3	7	10	9	4		0	6	4	4	0	0	8	8	0	1/1		
	CPT	SL	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	3	3	1	1	3/2	2	2	2
		HRS(S)	6	12	12	7	4	3	4	5	4	4	1	2	4	8	4	4	4	8
		HRS(P)	6	6	12	7	4	3	4	5	4		0	0	3	7	0	3/2		
(4) Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS)	LT	SL	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	3/2	2	2	2
		HRS(S)	30	15	4.2	19	4	3	2	3	4	4	4	8	11	5.5	3	10	10	4
		HRS(P)	25	11	4.2	19	4	3	2	3	4	4	0	0	14	2	0	.5/10		
	CPT	SL	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	3/2	2	2	2
		HRS(S)	8	8	5	9	4	5	2	2	4	4	4	4	32	6	4	4	4	1
		HRS(P)	8	5	5	3	0	5	2	2	6		0	0	30	1	0	2/4		

SUBJECTS

BRANCH SCHOOLS

PROPOSER

	IN	AR	F/A	AU	LN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM ¹	AG	F/I	QM	TC	MS	AV ² P	CA	CS	CSS	
(5) The Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS)	LT	SL	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	3/3	3	3	2
	HRS(S)	10	15	6.7	9	4	11	15	5	2	8	1	4	14	10	3	1/4	3	3	6	
	HRS(P)	9	12	1.7	9	4	11	15	5	6	8	2	2	12	12	0	1/0				
	CPT	SL	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	3/2	2	2	1	
	HRS(S)	7	20	20	10	4	9	15	3	3	6	1	4	4	8	4	2/14	4	4	3	
	HRS(P)	7	17	20	6	0	9	15	3	10		1	2	2	9	1	2/14				
d. Manpower																					
(1) Account-ability	LT	SL	1	3	4	3	3	2	4	2	3	2 ^h	2	2	3	3	1	3/3	2	2	2
	HRS(S)	1	.5	0	2	1	0	1	0	.5	8	16	2	3	3	3	2/.5	4	4	4	
	HRS(P)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	6	2	2	0	2	2/0				
	CPT	SL	1	1	4	2	2	1	2	2	1 ^h	1	2	1	2	1	3/3	1	1	1	
	HRS(S)	1	2	0	2	2	3	1	2	1	6	16	2	4	3	4	1/2	6	6	6	
	HRS(P)	1	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	7	7	4	3	0	0	1/2				
(2) Estimates	LT	SL	3	4	4	3	3	2	4	2	3	2	3	3	3	1	3/3	3	3	3	
	HRS(S)	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	.5	2	1	1	2	1.5	3	.5/.5	1	1	1	
	HRS(P)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5/0				
	CPT	SL	3	1	4	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	3	1	3/3	2	2	2	
	HRS(S)	1	2	0	2	1	3	2	1	1	2	1	2	4	1	4	1/2	2	2	2	
	HRS(P)	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	2	1/2				
(3) Casualty Reporting/Notification	LT	SL	3	2	3	3	2	3	4	2	3	1	3	3	3	3	3/3	2	2	3	
	HRS(S)	1	1	.5	1	1	0	1	0	.5	0	8	1	2	1	3	.5/.5	2	2	1	
	HRS(P)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	2	.5/0				
	CPT	SL	3	1	3	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	3	
	HRS(S)	1	1	.3	1	1	0	0	1	1	8	8	1	3	1.5	4	1	2	2	1	
	HRS(P)	1	1	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	2	3	0	1	1				
(4) Replacements	LT	SL	3	2	4	3	2	3	4	2	3	1	3	3	3	2	3/3	2	2	2	
	HRS(S)	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	.5	0	8	1	2	1	3	.5/.5	4	4	4	
	HRS(P)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10	0	0	0	0	.5/0				
	CPT	SL	3	1	3	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	3	2	2	3	4/3	2	2	2	
	HRS(S)	1	1	.2	1	1	0	0	1	1	16	16	1	2	1	4	0/1	4	4	4	
	HRS(P)	1	1	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9	3	2	0	1	0/1				

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPORTION

CSS

(5) Health Care

(a) Treatment of Casualties (First Aid)

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	UD	MHI	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS
LT																				
SL	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	3/2	1	1	1
HRS(S)	4	0	1	2	8	8	8	3	8	0	4	2	2	16	4.5	12	.5/1	4	4	4
HRS(P)	2	0	0	0	4	8	4	3	3	0	4	3	3	2	0	12	.5/0			

ANS

(b) Medical Evacuation

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	UD	MHI	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS
LT																				
SL	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2/2	1	1	1
HRS(S)	2	0	.6	2	4	3	8	5	8	0	1	2	2	8	3.5	3	1/5	4	4	4
HRS(P)	2	0	.5	0	0	3	0	0	1	0		0	0	0	0	0	1/0			

ANS

e. Supply

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	UD	MHI	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS
LT																				
SL	1	1	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	1	3/3	1	1	1
HRS(S)	2	1	.2	2	2	0	2	2	2	0	1	1	1	2	9	4	1/5	2	2	2
HRS(P)	2	1	.2	2	1	0	0	0	.2	1.5		0	0	0	0	4	1/0			

ANS

f. Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL)

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	UD	MHI	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS
LT																				
SL	3	2	4	2	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	2	3	1	2	3	3/3	2	2	2
HRS(S)	2	1	0	3	2	0	2	1	1	0	2	1	1	318	3	2	1/2	3	3	6
HRS(P)	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	243	0	0	1/1			

QM

9. Substance

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	UD	MHI	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AWP	CA	CS	CSS
LT																				
SL	3	2	4	3	2	3	2	4	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	3/3	2	2	2
HRS(S)	1	1	0	4	2	0	2	0	1	1	1	2	1	356	4	2	1/5	3	3	3
HRS(P)	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	349	2	0	1/0			

QM

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPORTION

h. Field Services

	IN	AR	FA	AU	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	PM ¹	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS	AV ²	CA	CS	CSS	
LT	SL	3	2	4	3	3	2	3	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	3/3	3	3	2
	HRS(S)	1	1	0	3	2	0	2	3	1	1	2	2	21	4	2	.5/.5	3	3	4	
	HRS(P)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	19	2	0	.5/0				
CPT	SL	2	1	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	1	2	3	2	2	2	3/3	3	3	2	
	HRS(S)	2	2	.2	3	2	0	2	5	1	1	2	2	20	4	2	.5/1	4	4	5	
	HRS(P)	2	1	0	0	10	0	0	0	.2	3		0	0	15	3	0/1				

21. Fundamentals of Combat:

a. Vehicle Recognition

LT	SL	3	2	1	2	3	3	2	3	2	3	4	3	2	2	3	4/2	1	1	1
HRS(S)	4	4	4.2	2	1	0	0	0	2	4	1	0	1	3	1	1	0/5	14	14	14
HRS(P)	4	1	.5	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0/5			
CPT	3	1	2	2	4	3	2	1	2	2	2	4	3	2	2	3	2/3	1	1	1
HRS(S)	2	2	2	2	0	0	4	8	1	0	1	0	1	4	2	1	2/2	7	7	7
HRS(P)	2	1	.5	0	0	0	2	0	1	0		0	0	0	1	0	2/2			

CATRADA

b. POW Processing

LT	SL	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	3	1	2	3	3	3	3	3	4/3	2/1	2/2	2/3	NP/MI
	HRS(S)	2	1	.2	1	1	0	8	.5	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	0/1	2/3	2/1	2/1	
	HRS(P)	2	0	.2	0	1	0	4	0	.5	.5	1	0	0	0	0	0/0				
CPT	SL	3	2	3	2	4	3	1	2	1	1	3	3	2	2	3	3	2/1	2/2	2/3	NP/MI
	HRS(S)	1	1	.2	2	0	0	6	.5	1	1	1	1	3	2	1	1	2/3	2/1	2/1	
	HRS(P)	1	1	.5	0	0	0	4	0	.2	0		0	0	0	0	0				

MP/MI

c. Geneva Convention

LT	SL	1	2	3	1	2	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2/1	3	3	3
	HRS(S)	2	2	3	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	4	3.5	1	1/1	2	2	2	
	HRS(P)	2	1	0	3	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	3	2	0/1				
CPT	SL	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	1/1	2	2	2
	HRS(S)	2	2	2	2	.5	1	2	2	1	0	1	1	4	2	2/1	4	4	
	HRS(P)	2	1	0	1	0	0	2	2	1.5	0		0	0	1	3	2	1.5/0	

JA

d. Code of Conduct

LT	SL	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2/1	3	3	3
HRS(S)	1	2	.2	1	1	3	2	15	1	2	1	1	1	4	3.5	1	1/1	1	1	1
HRS(P)	1	1	.2	2	0	3	2	0	2	.5	1	2	2	1	3	1	0/1			
CPT	1	1	3	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1/1	2	2	3
HRS(S)	1	3	.2	2	.5	1	2	2	1	0	1	1	1	4	2	1	2/1	2	2	1
HRS(P)	1	3	0	1	0	0	2	0	.1	0		0	0	1	3	1	1.5/0			

IMA

SUBJECTS

BRANCH SCHOOLS

PROPORTION

CA CS CSS

e. Process Captured Documents and Material

LT

SL
HRS(S)
HRS(P)

IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	F1	UM	TC	MS	AWP
3	3	3	3	2	3	2	1	2	3	2	3	3	2	2	3	3/3
1	1	.5	1	1	0	2	10	1	.5	1	1	1	3	1	.5	.5/1
1	1	.2	0	0	0	1	0	.5	.5	1	0	0	0	0	0	.5/0

CA 2/1 2/3 2/3
CS 2/2 2/1 2/1
CSS 2/1

f. Land Navigation

LT

SL
HRS(S)
HRS(P)

IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	F1	UM	TC	MS	AWP
1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	2/2
40	23	18	4	10	8	36	12	8	6	8	8	8	16	7	14	8/4
35	23	17	8	6	8	12	12	8	3	8	7	7	10	9	14	8/0

CA 1 1 1
CS 40 40 20
CSS 1CPT
SL
HRS(S)
HRS(P)

IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	F1	UM	TC	MS	AWP
1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	3/2
8	10	8	2	3	2	24	3	10	2	1	8	8	14	5	9	2/1
4	6	0	4	0	2	12	3	12	2	1	2	3	4	3	9	0/0

CA 1 1 1
CS 8 8 4
CSS 1

g. Use of Organic Radio Equipment (Radio and Wire Communications)

LT

SL
HRS(S)
HRS(P)

IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	F1	UM	TC	MS	AWP
1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4/2
12	27	9	12	8	0	24	15	4	6	10	8	8	10	8	4	0/5
6	27	9	6	7	0	12	15	8	4	10	0	0	3	9	4	0/5

CA 2 2 2
CS 40 40 40
CSS 2

h. Smoke Operations

LT

SL
HRS(S)
HRS(P)

IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	F1	UM	TC	MS	AWP
3	3	1	2	2	.3	3	3	1	3	3	4	3	2	3	3	4/3
1	1	1.5	1	1	0	2	1	15	0	1	0	1	3	1	1	0/1
1	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	11	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0/0

CA 2/2 2/2 3/2
CS 2/6 2/4 1/4
CSS 2/4

CPT

SL
HRS(S)
HRS(P)

IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	F1	UM	TC	MS	AWP
2	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	1	3	2	3	3	2	2	2	2/3
2	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	30	.5	1	1	1	3	2.5	1	2/1
2	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	20	.2	1	0	0	0	3	0	0/0

CA 2/1 2/1 3/1
CS 4/8 2/6 1/6
CSS 2/1

i. Strategic Deployment

LT

SL
HRS(S)
HRS(P)

IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	F1	UM	TC	MS	AWP
4	3	4	4	3	3	3	3	2	4	3	4	3	3	3	3	4/3
0	.5	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	2	1.5	.5	0/1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0/0

CA 2 2 2
CS 17 17 17
CSS 2CPT
SL
HRS(S)
HRS(P)

IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	UD	MM	AG	F1	UM	TC	MS	AWP
3	2	3	3	3	3	3	1	2	2	2	3	1	2	3	3	3
1	1	.5	3	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	16	15	1	.5	1
0	0	2	0	0	2/0	0	2	0	1	2	0	4	0	0	0	0

CA 1 1 1
CS 60 60 60
CSS 1

BRANCH SCHOOLS

PROPONENT

j. Training Management	LT	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM ⁱ	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	AV ^{jp}	CA	CS	CSS	
		SL	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	2	3/2	2	2	2
		HRS(S)	20	10	4.2	12	10	25	24	8	30	4	4	4	16	13	6	.5/4	16	16	16	
		HRS(P)	16	6	4.2	12	4	25	24	4	31	3	40	4	4	12	24	6	.5/0			
	CPT	SL	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2/1	1	1	1
		HRS(S)	22	15	14	14	8	256	25	8	30	24	10	16	8	12	12.5	8	16/16	30	30	30
		HRS(P)	22	15	14	14	5	256	25	4	34	9		3	0	3	24	8	16/16			
	k. How to Train	LT	SL	1	2	2	2	1	d	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	3/3	2	2	2
			HRS(S)	40	10	1	2	10		12	8	5	28	5	1	16	18	7	2	5/4	16	16
HRS(P)			40	6	1	2	3		4	0	3	4	5	0	0	3	2	2	5/0			
CPT		SL	1	1	2	1	1	d	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2/1	1	1	1
		HRS(S)	40	10	7	2	8		4	8	5	2	10	16	8	11	7.5	2	10/1	30	30	16
		HRS(P)	40	10	7	2	0		4	0	4	5		0	0	0	4	0	10/1			

- a. Concept deleted per draft FM 100-5, dated Jan 81.
- b. Includes integrated battlefield.
- c. #/# is 25 Track/72 Track, CPT only.
- d. How to Train included in Training Management.
- e. Cav/Ar
- f. Consolidation at para 5a, 6a, 8a.
- g. Included in 9d and e.
- h. Consolidated entry for paragraph or subparagraph below.
- i. Missile and Munition Center, Specialty Codes 73 and 75.
- j. #/# is Warrant Officer Candidate Military Development Course/Initial Entry Rotary Wing Course, LT data.
- k. See para 6f, breakout and link-up.
- l. See para 8b, cavalry reconnaissance.
- m. Treated as an obstacle under engineer subjects.
- n. Not applicable to CA LTs.
- o. Missile and Munition Center does not teach an Officer Advanced Course yet, HRS(p) not reported.
- p. #/# is Aviation Warrant Officer Advanced Course/Warrant Officer Senior Course, CPT data.
- q. More than half AMEDD officers accessions are direct commissions. All subjects rated SL-4, HRS(S)-0.

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX C

OVERALL SUFFICIENCY LEVELS OF SUBJECTS

In the list below subjects are annotated to show the percentage of schools and proponents that rated a subject at the 1 (fully proficient) or 2 (working knowledge) level. Percentages for lieutenants and captains are shown.

Key: CAPITAL LETTERS - Percentage 50% or more for lieutenants.
Underlined - Percentage 50% or more for captains.
* - Percentage 25% or less for lieutenants.
** - Percentage 25% or less for lieutenants and captains.

Appendixes:

- 1 - Subjects rated low for Lieutenants and high for Captains.
- 2 - Subjects rated low for Lieutenants and Captains.

SUBJECTSPercent at SL 1 or 2

1. Doctrinal Foundation:

LTCPTa. MISSION AND ROLE OF THE US ARMY

89

89

b. PRINCIPLES OF WAR

74

95

c. US Army Operational Concepts
(AirLand Battle)*(1) Enemy Air Defenses

16

42

*(2) Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses

21

37

(3) Close Air Support

32

68

*(4) Airspace Management

16

32

*(5) Protection of Sensors and
Deep Attack Systems

0

26

*(6) Extended Battlefield

21

58

d. UNDERLYING FUNDAMENTALS OF
MODERN COMBAT

68

89

2. Threat Background:

a. MISSION AND ROLE OF THE ARMED
FORCES

53

74

b. ORGANIZATIONS AND EQUIPMENT

58

74

c. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

53

84

d. Defensive Operations

47

79

e. Combat Support (including NBC &
Radio Electronic Combat (REC))

42

74

f. Special Operations

32

68

3. Organizational Basics:

a. LEADERSHIP

100

100

b. ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATION FOR
COMBAT

86

95

	<u>LT</u>	<u>CPT</u>
c. Command and Control and Communications (C ³)		
(1) <u>STAFF PROCEDURES IN COMBAT</u>	63	100
(2) <u>PLANS, ORDERS, GRAPHICS, RECORDS, AND REPORTS</u>	90	100
(3) <u>DECISION MAKING</u>	84	100
(4) <u>COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS (C²)</u>	68	95
4. Tactical Basics:		
a. <u>BATTLEFIELD MOVEMENT (MARCHES, MANEUVER)</u>	82	95
b. <u>Tactical Intelligence</u>	37	69
c. <u>OPERATIONAL SECURITY</u>	89	95
d. <u>Passage of Lines</u>	45	68
e. <u>River Crossing</u>	40	73
f. <u>OPERATIONS DURING PERIODS OF LIMITED VISIBILITY/NIGHT OPERATIONS</u>	68	77
g. <u>PATROLLING</u>	68	68
5. Offensive Operations:		
a. <u>CONCEPTS AND FUNDAMENTALS</u>	68	86
b. <u>Movement to Contact</u>	45	64
c. <u>Meeting Engagement</u>	41	67
d. <u>HASTY ATTACK</u>	50	68
e. <u>DELIBERATE ATTACK</u>	50	64
f. <u>Exploitation</u>	30	55
g. <u>Pursuit</u>	30	55

	<u>LT</u>	<u>CPT</u>
h. <u>Relief of Encircled Forces</u>	30	50
i. <u>Reconnaissance in Force</u>	32	47
*j. <u>Deception Operations</u> (Feints, Ruses, Raids)	25	45
6. <u>Defensive Operations:</u>		
a. <u>Concepts and Fundamentals</u>		
(1) <u>COVERING FORCE AREA</u>	59	82
(2) <u>MAIN BATTLE AREA</u>	59	82
(3) <u>REAR AREA</u>	82	95
b. <u>DEFENSE IN SECTOR</u>	50	68
c. <u>Defense from Battle Positions</u>		
(1) <u>LINEAR</u>	50	64
(2) <u>IN-DEPTH</u>	50	64
(3) <u>PERIMETER</u>	68	73
d. <u>STRONG POINTS</u>	50	59
e. <u>COUNTERATTACK</u>	50	64
f. <u>Breakout/Linkup</u>	36	64
g. <u>C³ OPTIONS ONCE THE BATTLE</u> <u>BEGINS</u>	53	68
7. <u>Retrograde Operations:</u>		
a. <u>Disengagement</u>	45	63
b. <u>Delay</u>	32	64
c. <u>Withdrawal</u>	27	55
*d. <u>Retirement</u>	14	29

	<u>LT</u>	<u>CPT</u>
8. Cavalry Operations (Air and Ground):		
a. <u>Concepts and Fundamentals</u>	26	53
*b. <u>Reconnaissance</u>	21	53
*c. Security	16	47
*d. Economy of Force	16	47
*e. Operations of Divisional Cavalry (Division 86)	5	37
*f. Covering Force	21	47
9. Special Military Operations:		
a. <u>MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN</u>	57	79
b. Rear Area Combat Operations (RACO)		
(1) <u>ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT</u>	50	77
(2) <u>PERIMETER DEFENSE</u>	68	86
(3) <u>ACTIVE/PASSIVE SECURITY</u>	68	86
(4) <u>WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT</u>	68	82
(5) <u>PHYSICAL LAYOUT OF REAR AREA</u>	55	82
c. <u>Reconstitution of Ineffective Units</u>	32	63
**d. Counterinsurgency Operations	16	16
*e. Counterterror Operations	23	45
**f. Special Forces Operations	5	21
**g. Foreign Internal Defense	0	21
*h. Unconventional Warfare	0	28
*i. Psychological Operations	0	26

	<u>LT</u>	<u>CPT</u>
*j. Civil Affairs	11	32
*k. Amphibious	11	26
*l. Airborne	5	32
m. <u>Airmobile</u>	27	55
**n. Ranger	5	11
10. Considerations for Special Environments:		
*a. Desert	14	45
*b. Jungle	16	37
*c. Mountain	16	37
*d. Northern Regions	16	37
11. Indirect Fire Support:		
a. <u>REQUEST AND ADJUST INDIRECT FIRE</u>	84	90
b. Artillery Effects (Shell fuze Combinations)	32	42
c. <u>Organization, Command and Control</u>	32	58
*d. <u>Priorities of Support on the Extended Battlefield</u>	16	58
*e. Land Space Requirements in the MBA and CFA	5	37
12. Air Defense:		
*a. <u>Short Range Air Defense Systems (SHORAD)</u>	16	63
b. <u>Man Portable Air Defense Systems</u>	26	68
*c. Non-Divisional Air Defense Systems	11	37
d. <u>UNIT ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE MEASURES</u>	58	79
e. <u>UNIT PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE MEASURES</u>	68	89

	<u>LT</u>	<u>CPT</u>
f. <u>Visual Aircraft Recognition</u>	42	63
g. <u>Priorities of Support on the Extended Battlefield</u>	32	58
*h. Land Space Requirements in the MBA and CFA	21	42
13. Army Aviation		
*a. Combat Aviation	16	42
*b. Combat Support Aviation	16	42
*c. <u>Combat Service Support Aviation</u>	11	58
14. Tactical Nuclear Operations:		
a. <u>NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS</u>	58	95
b. The Nuclear Battle		
*(1) <u>Planning</u>	16	58
*(2) <u>Tactics</u>	11	58
*c. Nuclear Release and Employment	16	42
*d. Nuclear Logistics	5	26
e. <u>Reconstitution</u>	32	53
f. <u>C³ on the Nuclear Battlefield</u>	37	79
15. Engineer Operations:		
a. Mobility	26	37
b. Countermobility	26	37
c. Survivability	26	37
*d. General Engineering	16	26
**e. Atomic Demolition Munition (ADM) Operations	11	16

	<u>LT</u>	<u>CPT</u>
16. NBC Warfare:		
a. <u>U.S. POLICY</u>	53	74
b. <u>THREAT POLICY</u>	53	79
c. <u>SURVIVABILITY</u>	84	95
d. <u>Offensive Use</u>	26	53
e. <u>Defensive Use</u>	47	74
f. <u>Reconstitution</u>	32	58
g. <u>NBC Logistics</u>	42	55
17. Electronic Warfare:		
*a. Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) (Intercepting, Identifying, Analyzing, Locating)	16	37
b. <u>Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) (Jamming, Electronic Deception)</u>	26	53
c. <u>SIGNAL SECURITY</u>	50	86
d. <u>Integrated Operations with Tactics</u>	26	63
18. Intelligence:		
*a. Electromagnetic Intelligence	11	26
**b. Imagery Intelligence	5	16
*c. Human Intelligence	21	42
*d. Counterintelligence	16	26
*e. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield	21	37
*f. Tactical All Source Intelligence Production and Management	11	32
*19. NATO Interoperability	5	47

	<u>LT</u>	<u>CPT</u>
20. Combat Service Support:		
a. Transportation		
(1) Load Planning		
(a) <u>Air</u>	42	63
(b) <u>Land</u>	47	58
(c) <u>Sea</u>	32	47
(2) <u>CONVOY OPERATIONS</u>	74	84
(3) <u>MOVEMENT CONTROL</u>	58	74
(4) Aviation Logistics	26	42
b. Ammunition		
(1) <u>Support Structure and Requisitioning</u>	42	68
(2) <u>SAFETY, STORAGE, AND TRANSPORTATION</u>	68	79
(3) <u>Supply Rates and DAO Functions</u>	26	53
(4) <u>Munitions Identification</u>	47	58
(5) <u>Emergency Destruction Procedures</u>	42	58
*(6) EOD Operations	16	32
c. Maintenance		
(1) <u>RECOVERY AND EVACUATION</u>	63	79
(2) <u>COMMAND AND STAFF MANAGEMENT OF PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE</u>	79	90
(3) <u>REPAIR PARTS SUPPLY (PLL)</u>	74	90
(4) <u>PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE CHECKS AND SERVICES (PMCS)</u>	95	100

	<u>LT</u>	<u>CPT</u>
(5) <u>THE ARMY MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (TAMMS)</u>	89	100
d. Manpower		
(1) <u>ACCOUNTABILITY</u>	58	90
(2) <u>Estimates</u>	26	79
(3) <u>Casualty Reporting/ Notification</u>	42	68
(4) <u>REPLACEMENTS</u>	53	68
(5) Health Care		
(a) <u>TREATMENT OF CASUALTIES (FIRST AID)</u>	100	100
(b) <u>MEDICAL EVACUATION</u>	63	84
e. <u>SUPPLY</u>	100	100
f. <u>PETROLEUM, OIL, AND LUBRICANTS (POL)</u>	63	74
g. <u>SUBSISTENCE</u>	63	79
h. <u>FIELD SERVICES</u>	53	68
21. Fundamentals of Combat:		
a. <u>VEHICLE RECOGNITION</u>	53	68
b. <u>POW Processing</u>	41	64
c. <u>GENEVA CONVENTION</u>	74	100
d. <u>CODE OF CONDUCT</u>	79	90
e. <u>PROCESS CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL</u>	50	64
f. <u>LAND NAVIGATION</u>	100	100
g. <u>USE OF ORGANIC RADIO EQUIPMENT (RADIO AND WIRE COMMUNICATIONS)</u>	100	100

	<u>LT</u>	<u>CPT</u>
h. <u>Smoke Operations</u>	45	73
*i. <u>Strategic Deployment</u>	21	53
j. <u>TRAINING MANAGEMENT</u>	100	100
k. <u>HOW TO TRAIN</u>	100	100

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX C

OVERALL SUFFICIENCY LEVEL OF SUBJECTS

APPENDIX 1

SUBJECTS RATED LOW FOR LIEUTENANTS AND HIGH FOR CAPTAINS

1. Doctrinal Foundation:
 - c. U.S. Operational Concepts:
 - (3) Close Air Support
 - (6) Extended Battlefield
4. Tactical Basics:
 - b. Tactical Intelligence
8. Cavalry Operations (Air and Ground):
 - a. Concepts and Fundamentals
 - b. Reconnaissance
9. Special Military Operations:
 - m. Airmobile
11. Indirect Fire Support:
 - d. Priorities of Support on the Extended Battlefield
12. Air Defense:
 - a. Short Range Air Defense Systems
 - b. Man Portable Air Defense Systems
13. Army Aviation:
 - c. Combat Service Support, Aviation
14. Tactical Nuclear Operations:
 - b. The Nuclear Battle
 - (1) Planning
 - (2) Tactics
 - f. C³ on the Nuclear Battlefield

- 17. Electronic Warfare:
 - b. Electronic Countermeasures
 - d. Integrated Operations with Tactics.
- 19. NATO Interoperability
- 20. Combat Service Support:
 - d. Manpower
 - (2) Estimates
- 21. Fundamentals of Combat:
 - i. Strategic Deployment

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX C

OVERALL SUFFICIENCY LEVEL OF SUBJECTS

APPENDIX 2

SUBJECTS RATED LOW FOR LIEUTENANTS AND CAPTAINS

1. Doctrinal Foundation:
 - c. U.S. Army Operational Concepts:
 - (2) Suppression of Enemy Air Defense
 - (4) Air Space Management
 - (5) Protection of Sensors and Deep Attack Systems
7. Retrograde Operations:
 - d. Retirement
8. Cavalry Operations (Air and Ground):
 - e. Operations of Divisional Cavalry (Division 86)
9. Special Military Operations:
 - d. Counterinsurgency Operations
 - f. Special Forces Operations
 - g. Foreign Internal Defense
 - h. Unconventional Warfare
 - i. Psychological Operations
 - j. Civil Affairs
 - k. Amphibious
 - l. Airborne
 - n. Ranger
10. Considerations for Special Environments
11. Indirect Fire Support:
 - e. Land Space Requirements in the MBA and CFA
12. Air Defense:
 - c. Non-Divisional Air Defense Systems
14. Tactical Nuclear Operations:
 - d. Nuclear Logistics

- 15. Engineer Operations
- 17. Electronic Warfare:
 - a. Electronic Warfare Support
- 18. Intelligence
- 20. Combat Service Support:
 - b. Ammunition
 - (6) EOD Operations

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX D

GROUPING OF SUBJECTS BY CATEGORY

1. In our analysis it was determined that the responses to the study could be grouped into the categories of Sufficient, Insufficient, and Not Determined. This annex provides a consolidated listing of subjects by category.

2. Sufficient: High level of agreement on appropriate sufficiency level. Agreement on hours associated with sufficiency levels appears meaningful. Variation of hours appears to be, in general, appropriate to the branch's level of participation in combined arms operations. Service schools should compare their responses against the other schools and against their own Programs of Instruction. These are several subjects for which the proponent's response is quite different from that of most of the schools. These should be reviewed by proponents. A listing of subjects in this category is at appendix 1.

3. Insufficient: In this category are those subjects which are, in most cases, assigned sufficiency levels inadequate or inappropriate to the importance of the subject to all members of the Combined Arms Team. Proponents are tasked to review the current state of their guidance to the field and schools are tasked to re-examine the adequacy of their POIs in these areas. A list of these subjects is at appendix 2.

4. Not Determined: In general, subjects in this category show agreement on sufficiency level ratings, but a wide variance on hours associated with sufficiency levels. This variance appears to be caused by a combination of factors which include subject overlap, lack of precise definition, and failure to discriminate between the combined arms and purely technical aspects of the subject. Proponents will be asked to review each of these subjects and provide more precise definition. A list of these subjects is at appendix 3.

Appendixes:

- 1 - Sufficient
- 2 - Insufficient
- 3 - Not Determined

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX D

GROUPING OF SUBJECTS BY CATEGORY

APPENDIX 1

- SUFFICIENT

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PROPONENT</u>
1. Doctrinal Foundation:	
a. Mission and role of the US Army	CGSC
b. Principles of War	CGSC
c. US Army Operational Concepts (AirLand Battle)	
Close Air Support	CGSC
d. Underlying Fundamentals of Modern Combat	CGSC
4. Tactical Basics:	
a. Battlefield Movement (Marches, Maneuver)	IN/AR
c. Operational Security	CGSC
d. Passage of Lines	IN/AR
* e. River Crossing	IN/AR/EN
5. Offensive Operations:	IN/AR
7. Retrograde Operations:	IN/AR
8. Cavalry Operations (Air and Ground):	AR
9. Special Military Operations:	
b. Rear Area Combat Operations (RACO)	CGSC/MP

d. Counterinsurgency Operations	IN
e. Counterterror Operations	MP/IMA
f. Special Forces Operations	IMA
g. Foreign Internal Defense	IMA
h. Unconventional Warfare	IMA
i. Psychological Operations	IMA
j. Civil Affairs	IMA
k. Amphibious	IN
l. Airborne	IN
m. Airmobile	IN/AV
n. Ranger	IN
10. Considerations for Special Environments:	
a. Desert	IN/AR
b. Jungle	IN
c. Mountain	IN
d. Northern Regions	IN
11. Indirect Fire Support:	
b. Artillery Effects (Shell fuze Combinations)	FA
c. Organization, Command and Control	FA
d. Priorities of Support on the Extended Battlefield	FA
e. Land Space Requirements in the MBA and CFA	FA
16. NBC Warfare:	CM
*18. Intelligence:	MI

*19. NATO Interoperability:	CACDA
20. Combat Service Support:	
a. Transportation	
(1) Load Planning	TC
(a) Air	TC
(b) Land	
(c) Sea	
(4) Aviation Logistics	TC
b. Ammunition	MM
21. Fundamentals of Combat:	
b. POW Processing	MP/MI
c. Geneva convention	FA
d. Code of Conduct	IMA
e. Process Captured Documents and Material	MP/MI
* f. Land Navigation	IN
* g. Use of Organic Radio Equipment (Radio and Wire Communications)	SC
h. Smoke Operations	FA/CM
* i. Strategic Deployment	CGSC

* Proponents should review input.

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX D

GROUPING OF SUBJECTS BY CATEGORY

APPENDIX 2

INSUFFICIENT

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PROPONENT</u>
2. Threat Background:	CACDA
a. Mission and Role of the Armed Forces	
b. Organizations and Equipment	
c. Offensive Operations	
d. Defensive Operations	
e. Combat Support (including NBC & Radio Electronic Combat (REC)	
f. Special Operations	
4. Tactical Basics:	
b. Tactical Intelligence	MI
g. Patrolling	IN
9. Special Military Operations:	
a. Military Operations in Urban Terrain	IN
13. Army Aviation	AV
15. Engineer Operations:	EN
17. Electronic Warfare:	MI
21. Fundamentals of Combat:	
j. Training Management	CGSC

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX D

GROUPING OF SUBJECTS BY CATEGORY

APPENDIX 3

NOT DETERMINED

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PROPONENT</u>
3. Organizational Basics:	
a. Leadership	CGSC
b. Organization and Preparation for Combat	IN/AR
c. Command and Control and Communications (C ³):	CGSC
(1) Staff Procedures in Combat	
(2) Plans, Orders, Graphics, Records, and Reports	
(3) Decision Making	
(4) Command and Control Communications (C ²)	
4. Tactical Basics:	
f. Operations During Periods of Limited Visibility/Night Operations	IN/AR
6. Defensive Operations:	IN/AR
9. Special Military Operations:	
c. Reconstitution of Ineffective Units	CGSC
11. Indirect Fire Support:	
a. Request and Adjust Indirect Fire	FA

12. Air Defense:	AD
14. Tactical Nuclear Operations:	FA
20. Combat Service Support:	
a. Transportation	
(2) Convoy Operations	TC
(3) Movement Control	TC
c. Maintenance	OD/QM
d. Manpower	SSC
e. Supply	QM
f. Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL)	QM
g. Subsistence	QM
h. Field Services	QM
21. Fundamentals of Combat:	
a. Vehicle Recognition	CATRADA
k. How to Train	CATRADA

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX E

THE ROLE OF PROPONENTS IN COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY

1. It was established at the beginning of the Combined Arms Sufficiency Study that the subject proponents should have a major role in determining sufficiency requirements. Each of the subjects on the list has a proponent commandant who was identified from current established responsibilities for doctrine development. These proponents were asked to recommend sufficiency levels and hours of instruction for each of their subjects. Their recommendations were by grade (pre-commissioning, lieutenants, and captains), and further subdivided into recommendations for Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support officers.

2. In the categorization of subjects discussed in paragraph 6 of the main report (Sufficient, Insufficient, Not Determined) we considered the input from proponents, but that input was not the only determining factor in the selection of subject placement. There are subjects in each category where joint proponents disagree with each other about sufficiency of coverage. In some cases, proponents' recommendations are well outside the norm of most schools' responses. In these cases judgments on sufficiency often discounted the proponent's input.

3. Traditionally, proponents have had very little input to decisions on the contents of programs of instruction at service schools. In the officer/job task analysis process, however, proponents are being tasked to develop training support packages for the common and shared tasks to be included in Military Qualification Standards Manuals and in officer training programs. When proponent input was requested as part of this study, we realized that we were asking for the proponent to state an opinion about content of POI, an opinion of a type not heretofore requested. After a review of the consolidated data we received in return, it appears that the proponent can now play an important role in resolving some of the areas of apparent disagreement between schools in the treatment of specific subjects.

4. For example, a look at three subjects in the Not Determined category serves to illustrate what appears to be confusion in the field over what should be taught, and how much. They also illustrate areas where the proponents can serve the common good by reviewing the doctrine and providing advice and support to teaching schools.

a. Leadership. Although all respondents rated this subject at a sufficiency level of 1 or 2, the hours reported as necessary to reach that level of sufficiency varied from 7 to 80. The proponent (CGSC) rated sufficiency at level 1 and estimated 30 hours of instruction required. In this wide range of responses there is no clear correlation between sufficiency level/hours and grouping of branches by CA, CS and CSS. Upon examination, it

seems likely that the variation results from differences between respondents concerning just what this subject encompasses, and how much of what they now teach (or think they should be teaching) can be considered "leadership". In this case the proponent should provide some standardized guidelines for the conduct or leadership training. This is, in fact, a project being worked by the CGSC, the designated leadership proponent.

b. Defensive Operations. In most cases, this subject had sufficiency level ratings of 1 and 2, but it is difficult to discern any overall pattern to the responses. At the time of the study, doctrine and terminology were changing and terms such as "defense in sector" did not mean the same thing to all respondents. Until we have a clear definition of the subject, coordinated between the joint proponents and the proponent of FM 100-5, this area will remain murky. Clearly, proponents can assist here by arriving at common terms, mutually acceptable doctrine, and coordinated training responsibility.

c. Combat Service Support. Two sub-areas, Maintenance and Supply, are good examples of subjects reflecting general agreement on sufficiency levels, but wide variation in hours required to reach proficiency. We suspect that the cause of variation here is failure to differentiate between combined arms training requirements and garrison training requirements. We cannot, for example, determine from the data whether the training reported under TAMMS educates the officer on how the system will function to sustain the force in combat, or whether it focuses on how to survive maintenance inspections in a garrison environment. Both are of concern to the commandant as he makes his decision about POI development, but only the former was the concern of this study. Here the proponent can help by specifying more precisely what officers need to know, as it relates to supporting combat activities.

5. It seems very likely that a number of subject areas (particularly those in the Insufficient and Not Determined categories) could be improved by the proponents comparing their input against that of the schools, reviewing the current state of their support to the field, and by providing advice and assistance to the teaching schools.

6. Proponents can host updates and seminars for the personnel tasked to teach their subjects at the service schools. This study would provide an instrument to refine the focus of those sessions by allowing the proponent to see how his subject areas are viewed through the eyes of other school commandants.

7. Some subjects appear to mean different things to different schools. This lack of agreement may have been a contributing cause of variation between the schools' responses. One major contribution proponents can make to mutual understanding is to develop and coordinate concise definitions of their subjects.

8. Following are three proposals under consideration for inclusion in a Combined Arms Sufficiency Action Plan:

a. Task joint proponents to coordinate their recommended sufficiency levels to resolve differences.

b. Task proponents for subjects in the Not Determined category to develop and coordinate definitions of their subjects.

c. Following refinement of the subject list, CAC to resurvey proponents to obtain a revised set of recommendations on sufficiency levels and hours.

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX F

METHODOLOGY

1. **Subject List.** An initial list was developed through a review of FM 100-5 and various lists that have been generated through Officer Job/Task Analysis. Subject proponents were established by the use of TRADOC Circular 350-81-2, Officer Job/Task Analysis and Training Development. This initial list was staffed through CATRADA, CACDA, And CGSC. A revised list was staffed to all participants in the study (See Annex A for a list of study participants). The list was revised again and staffed within the Combined Arms Center. The final list is at Annex G. The final list was the basis for the questionnaires.

2. Two questionnaires were developed, one for branches and one for proponents.

a. A proponency evaluation form is at Appendix 1. Proponents were asked to rate their subjects for sufficiency level and to provide the number of hours they associated with that level of sufficiency. Sufficiency level was rated for lieutenants prior to the Officer Basic Course, lieutenants at the end of the Officer Basic Course, and captains at the end of the Officer Advanced Course. Lieutenants and captains were further subdivided by combat arms, combat support arms, and combat service support arms.

b. A branch evaluation form is at Appendix 2. Each school was asked to establish sufficiency levels for the officers of their branch; lieutenants prior to attending the Officer Basic Course (pre-commissioning), lieutenants at the end of the basic Course, and captains at the end of the Advanced Course. In addition to establishing sufficiency levels and hours of instruction associated with that sufficiency level, each school was asked to state the number of hours they currently teach on each subject. There were four exceptions to this general direction. The Academy of Health Sciences addressed all Army Medical Department Officers instead of one branch. The Missile and Munitions Center addressed their future courses for Specialty Codes 73 (Missile Material Management) and 75 (Munitions Material Management) while the Ordnance Center addressed training for other Ordnance Corps Officers. The Aviation Center was asked to evaluate their courses for warrant officers. The Judge Advocate General's School declined participation as a respondent on the branch evaluation part of the study.

Appendixes:

- 1-Proponency Evaluation Form
- 2-Branch Evaluation Form

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX F

METHODOLOGY

APPENDIX 1

PROPENSITY EVALUATION FORM

SUFFICIENCY LEVEL INDICATORS*

In order to perform his duties effectively:

1. Officer must be fully proficient in subject.
2. Officer must have a working knowledge of subject.
3. Officer must be familiar with subject.
4. No training required.

Evaluate each subject based on the following questions:

PRE-COMMISSIONING

"In Column A 1, using Sufficiency Level Indicators 1 through 4, indicate the level of knowledge that all lieutenants should attain prior to attending their branch related Officer Basic Course. In Column A 2, indicate the number of hours of instruction you equate to that level of knowledge."

COMBAT ARMS

"In Column B 1, indicate the level of knowledge that CA lieutenants should attain at completion of the Officer Basic Course. In Column B 2, indicate the number of hours of instruction you equate to that level of knowledge for lieutenants. In Column B 3, indicate the level of knowledge that CA captains should attain at completion of the Officer Advanced Course. In Column B 4, the number of hours of instruction for captains."

COMBAT SUPPORT ARMS

"In Column C 1, indicate the level of knowledge that CS lieutenants should attain at completion of the Officer Basic Course. In Column C 2, indicate the number of hours of instruction you equate to that level of knowledge for lieutenants. In Column C 3, indicate the level of knowledge that CS captains should attain at completion of the Officer Advanced Course. In Column C 4, the number of hours of instruction for captains."

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ARMS

"In Column D 1, indicate the level of knowledge that CSS lieutenants should attain at completion of the Officer Basic Course. In Column D 2, indicate the number of hours of instruction you equate to that level of knowledge for lieutenants. In Column D 3, indicate the level of knowledge that CSS captains should attain at completion of the Officer Advanced Course. In Column D 4, the number of hours of instruction for captains."

* Indicators 1 through 4 will be used to answer all questions pertaining to levels of knowledge (Columns A1, B1, B3, C1, C3, D1, D3).

PROFICIENCY EVALUATION FORM

A		B		C		D	
1	2	1	2	3	4	1	2
3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

F-1-2

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX F

METHODOLOGY

APPENDIX 2

BRANCH EVALUATION FORM

SUFFICIENCY LEVEL INDICATORS*

In order to perform his duties effectively:

1. Officer must be fully proficient in subject.
2. Officer must have a working knowledge of subject.
3. Officer must be familiar with subject.
4. No training required.

Evaluate each subject based on the following questions:

PRE-COMMISSIONING

"In Column A 1, using Sufficiency Level Indicators 1 through 4, indicate the level of knowledge that your lieutenants should attain prior to attending the Officer Basic Course. In Column A 2, indicate the number of hours of instruction you equate to that level of knowledge."

OFFICER BASIC COURSE

"In Column B 1, indicate the level of knowledge that your lieutenants should attain at completion of the Officer Basic Course. In Column B 2, indicate the number of hours of instruction you equate to that level of knowledge. In Column B 3, indicate the number of hours your institution presently instructs in this subject."

OFFICER ADVANCED COURSE

"In Column C 1, indicate the level of knowledge that your captains should attain at completion of the Officer Advanced Course. In Column C 2, indicate the number of hours of instruction you equate to that level of knowledge. In Column C 3, indicate the number of hours your institution presently instructs in this subject."

- * Indicators 1 through 4 will be used to answer all questions pertaining to levels of knowledge (Columns A1, B1, C1).

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

BRANCH EVALUATION FORM

A		B			C		
1	2	1	2	3	1	2	3

1. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION:

A. MISSION AND ROLE OF THE US ARMY

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

B. PRINCIPLES OF WAR

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

C. US ARMY OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

(AIRLAND BATTLE)

(1) ENEMY AIR DEFENSES

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

(2) SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR

DEFENSES

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

(3) CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

(4) AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

(5) PROTECTION OF SENSORS AND

DEEP ATTACK SYSTEMS

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

(6) EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX G

CONSOLIDATED SUBJECT LIST

This annex contains a one-page reproduction of the subject list used as the basis for the conduct of the study. The method of constructing this list is described at Annex F, Methodology. Detailed discussion of the subjects is at Annex D.

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY SUBJECTS LIST

1. Doctrinal Foundation:		
a. Mission and role of the US Army	CGSC	
b. Principles of War	CGSC	
c. US Army Operational Concepts (Airland Battle)		
(1) Enemy Air Defenses	CGSC	
(2) Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses	CGSC	
(3) Close Air Support	CGSC	
(4) Airspace Management	CGSC	
(5) Protection of Sensors and Deep Attack Systems	CGSC	
(6) Extended Battlefield	CGSC	
d. Underlying Fundamentals of Modern Combat	CGSC	
2. Threat Background		
a. Mission & Role of the Armed Forces	CACDA	
b. Organizations and Equipment	CACDA	
c. Offensive Operations	CACDA	
d. Defensive Operations	CACDA	
e. Combat Support (including NBC & Radio Electronic Combat (REC))	CACDA	
f. Special Operations	CACDA	
3. Organizational Basics:		
a. Leadership	CGSC	
b. Organization and Preparation for Combat	IN/AR	
c. Command & Control & Communications (C3)		
(1) Staff Procedures in Combat	CGSC	
(2) Plans, Orders, Graphics, Records and Reports	CGSC	
(3) Decision Making	CGSC	
(4) Command & Control Communications (C2)	CGSC	
4. Tactical Basics:		
a. Battlefield Movement (Marches, Maneuver)	IN/AR	
b. Tactical Intelligence	MI	
c. Operational Security	CGSC	
d. Passage of Lines	IN/AR	
e. River Crossing	IN/AR/EN	
f. Operations During Periods of Limited Visibility/night operations	IN/AR	
g. Patrolling	IN	
5. Offensive Operations:		
a. Concepts and Fundamentals	IN/AR	
b. Movement to Contact	IN/AR	
c. Meeting Engagement	IN/AR	
d. Hasty Attack	IN/AR	
e. Deliberate Attack	IN/AR	
f. Exploitation	IN/AR	
g. Pursuit	IN/AR	
h. Relief of Encircled Forces	IN/AR	
i. Reconnaissance in Force	IN/AR	
j. Deception Operations (Feints, Ruses, Raids)	IN/AR	
6. Defensive Operations:		
a. Concepts and Fundamentals		
(1) Covering Force Area	IN/AR	
	IN/AR	
d. Priorities of Support on the Extended Battlefield		FA
e. Land Space Requirements in the MSA and CFA		FA
12. Air Defense:		
a. Short Range Air Defense Systems (SHORAD)		AO
b. Man Portable Air Defense Systems		AO
c. Non-Divisional Air Defense Systems		AO
d. Unit Active Air Defense Measures		AO
e. Unit Passive Air Defense Measures		AO
f. Visual Aircraft Recognition		AO
g. Priorities of Support on the Extended Battlefield		AO
h. Land Space Requirements in the MSA and CFA		AO
13. Army Aviation		
a. Combat Aviation		AV
b. Combat Support Aviation		AV
c. Combat Service Support Aviation		AV
14. Tactical Nuclear Operations:		
a. Nuclear Weapons Effects		FA
b. The Nuclear Battle		
(1) Planning		FA
(2) Tactics		FA
c. Nuclear Release and Employment		FA
d. Nuclear Logistics		FA
e. Reconstitution		FA
f. CS on the Nuclear Battlefield		CGSC
15. Engineer Operations:		
a. Mobility		EN
b. Countermobility		EN
c. Survivability		EN
d. General Engineering		EN
e. Atomic Demolition Munition (ADM) Operations		EN
16. NBC Warfare:		
a. U.S. Policy		CM
b. Threat Policy		CM
c. Survivability		CM
d. Offensive Use		CM
e. Defensive Use		CM
f. Reconstitution		CM
g. NBC Logistics		CM/MM
17. Electronic Warfare:		
a. Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) (Intercepting, Identifying, Analyzing, Locating)		MI
b. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) (Jamming, Electronic Deception)		MI
c. Signal Security		MI/SC
d. Integrated Operations with Tactics		MI
18. Intelligence:		
a. Electromagnetic Intelligence		MI
b. Imagery Intelligence		MI
c. Human Intelligence		MI
d. Counterintelligence		MI
e. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield		MI

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

ANNEX H

PRECOMMISSIONING DATA

1. Schools and proponents were requested to provide their views on sufficiency levels appropriate for officers prior to attending the basic course. This information was collected primarily to determine if the approach used by this study yielded information at variance with the ongoing Officer Job/Task Analysis (OJTA) effort.

2. Review of the data shows a high level of agreement between Military Qualification Standards I tasks and those items receiving high sufficiency level ratings. The items rated high on the sufficiency study were:

Mission and Role of the US Army

Principles of War

Leadership

Decision Making

Patrolling

Request and Adjust Indirect Fire

First Aid

Code of Conduct

Land Navigation

COMBINED ARMS SUFFICIENCY STUDY

P-1

PRE-COMMISSIONING

SUBJECTS

BRANCH SCHOOLS

PROPOSER

1. Doctrinal Foundation:

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	FM	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	
a. Mission and role of the US Army	SL	3	3	2	3	3	2	2	1	3	3	2	3	2	3	4	CGSC
	HRS(S)	1	8	4	4	1	4	4	10	2	12	2	4	4	3	2.5	2
b. Principles of War	SL	3	3	2	1	3	3	3	1	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	CGSC
	HRS(S)	1	6	4	2	1	2	2	10	4	1	2	2	2	4	3	4
c. US Army Operational Concepts (Airland Battle)																	
(1) Enemy Air Defenses	SL	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	3	3	4	4	4	CGSC
	HRS(S)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3h	1	1	1	0	0	0
(2) Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses	SL	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	CGSC
	HRS(S)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(3) Close Air Support	SL	4	3	4	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	4	3	CGSC
	HRS(S)	0	2	0	2	0	1	1	3	1	0	1	1	0	2	2	0
(4) Airspace Management	SL	4	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	CGSC
	HRS(S)	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(5) Protection of Sensors and Deep Attack Systems	SL	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	CGSC
	HRS(S)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(6) Extended Battlefield	SL	4	4	4	3	4	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	CGSC
	HRS(S)	0	0	0	2	0	2	1	0	1	3	1	1	0	2.5	0	0
d. Underlying Fundamentals of Modern Combat	SL	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	CGSC
	HRS(S)	1	1	4	1	4	3	4	3	1	2	1	10	10	1	2.5	8

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPRUPOMENT

2. Threat Background:

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	QA	OU	Mt ¹	AG	F1	QA	TC	MS	
a. Mission and Role of the Armed Forces	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 2	3 1	3 3	3 2	3 1	3 ^h 9	3 2	3 2	3 1	3 2	3 2	CACDA .5
b. Organizations and Equipment	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 4	3 4	3 0	3 2	3 1	3 0	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1.5	3 1	CACDA 1
c. Offensive Operations	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 2	3 8	3 1	3 2	3 1	3 0	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 2	3 1.5	CACDA 1
d. Defensive Operations	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 2	3 2	3 1	3 2	3 1	3 0	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 3	3 1.5	CACDA .5
e. Combat Support (including NBC & Radio Electronic Combat (REC))	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 6	3 2	3 .5	3 0	3 2	3 2	3 0	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 0	3 2	3 2	3 1	CACDA .5
f. Special Operations	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 2	3 0	3 .5	3 0	3 1	3 2	3 0	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 0	3 1	3 1	3 1	CACDA .5
3. Organizational Basics:																	
a. Leadership	SL HRS(S)	2 20	3 16	2 12	3 30	2 25	1 400	3 80	2 10	2 6	2 45	2 ^h 46	2 20	2 20	2 16	2 16	CGSC 70
b. Organization and Preparation for Combat	SL HRS(S)	3 2	4 0	3 1	3 2	3 1	3 80	3 20	3 3	3 1	3 3	2 10	2 10	3 5	3 14	3 2	IN 2
c. Command and Control and Communications (C3)																	
(1) Staff Procedures in Combat	SL HRS(S)	3 1	4 0	3 2	3 2	3 1	3 4	3 10	4 0	3 2	3 2	2 2	3 2	3 2	3 5	3 1	CGSC 12
(2) Plans, Orders, Graphics, Records, and Reports	SL HRS(S)	3 5	3 10	3 1	3 2	3 5	3 6	3 30	4 0	3 2	2 4	3 2	3 2	3 4	3 5	3 5	CGSC 15

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPOONENT

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OD	MMI	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	
(3) Decision Making	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	2		2	3	2	2		2
	HRS(S)	3	2	4	2	3	4	4	10	2		2	2	5	13		12
(4) Command and Control Communications (C ²)	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	3		3	3	3	3		3
	HRS(S)	2	2	1	2	2	6	3	0	1		2	2	5	3		6
4. Tactical Basics:																	
a. Battlefield Movement (Marches, Maneuver)	SL	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	3h	3	3	3	3		3/3
	HRS(S)	12	4	4	10	2	50	4	3	12	20	2	2	5	4		12/4
b. Tactical Intelligence	SL	3	3	2	3	3	3	4	3	3		3	3	3	3		4
	HRS(S)	2	1	4	4	1	5	2	0	2		2	2	1	2		0
c. Operational Security	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3		1
	HRS(S)	2	2	3	2	1	3	2	3	1		2	2	1	5.5		4
d. Passage of Lines	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	4		3	3	3	3		3/3
	HRS(S)	1	1	3	2	1	2	2	0	0		1	1	1	1		1/1
e. River Crossing	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4		4	4	3	3		3/3/3
	HRS(S)	2	1	5	2	1	2	3	3	0		0	0	1	2		2/1/1
f. Operations During Periods of Limited Visibility/Night Operations	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2		3	3	3	3		3/3
	HRS(S)	1	8	8	4	2	2	3	3	6		4	4	4	4		1/8
g. Patrolling	SL	3	2	3	2	3	3	1	3	2		2	3	3	3		3
	HRS(S)	20	24	8	10	4	20	6	15	6		4	4	4	8		20
5. Offensive Operations:																	
a. Concepts and Fundamentals	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3h	1	3	3	3		3/3
	HRS(S)	4	4	4	2	4	10	3	5	.5	6	4	4	4	3		4/4

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPORTION

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OD	MMI	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	
b. Movement to Contact	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3	3/3
	HR(S)	4	1	2	1	.5	1	3	.2	.5		4	4	2	1.5		4/1
c. Meeting Engagement	SL	3	3	3	3	.5	a	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3	3/3
	HR(S)	4	1	2	1			3	.2	.5		4	4	2	1.5		4/1
d. Hasty Attack	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3	3/3
	HR(S)	4	1	2	1	.5	1	3	.2	.5		4	4	2	1.5		4/1
e. Deliberate Attack	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3	3/3
	HR(S)	2	1	2	1	.5	1	3	.5	.5		2	2	2	2	2	2/1
f. Exploitation	SL	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		4	4	3	3	3	4/3
	HR(S)	0	1	1	1	.5	5	3	.5	.5		0	0	2	1.5		0/1
g. Pursuit	SL	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		4	4	3	3	3	4/3
	HR(S)	0	1	.5	1	.5	.5	3	.2	.5		0	0	2	1.5		0/1
h. Relief of Encircled Forces	SL	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		4	4	3	3	3	4/3
	HR(S)	0	1	.5	1	.5	.5	3	.2	.5		0	0	1	1		0/1
i. Reconnaissance in Force	SL	4	3	3	3	3	a	3	3	3		4	4	3	3	3	4/3
	HR(S)	0	1	.5	1	.5		3	.2	.5		0	0	2	1		0/1
j. Deception Operations (Feints, Ruses, Raids)	SL	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		4	4	3	3	3	4/4
	HR(S)	0	0	.5	1	.5	1	3	.5	.5		0	0	2	1		0/0

6. Defensive Operations:

a. Concepts and Fundamentals

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPORTION

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	DI	OD	MM ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	
(1) Covering Force Area	SL	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3h	3	3	3	3	3	3/3
	HRS(S)	1	2	1	2	4	2	3	.5	1	9	2	2	1	1	1	1/2
(2) Main Battle Area	SL	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3	3/3
	HRS(S)	1	2	3	2	4	2	3	.5	1		2	2	1	1	1	1/2
(3) Rear Area	SL	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3	3/3
	HRS(S)	1	2	1	2	4	1	3	.5	1		2	2	1	1.5	1	1/2
b. Defense in Sector	SL	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3	3/3
	HRS(S)	4	2	1	2	10	1	3	.5	1		2	2	1	2	2	4/2
c. Defense from Battle Positions																	
(1) Linear	SL	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3	3/4
	HRS(S)	2	0	1	2	1	.5	2	.5	1		1	1	1	2	2	2/0
(2) In-Depth	SL	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3	3/4
	HRS(S)	2	0	1	2	1	.5	2	.5	1		1	1	1	2	2	2/0
(3) Perimeter	SL	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3	3/3
	HRS(S)	2	4	1	4	1	.5	2	.5	1		1	1	1	2	2	2/4
d. Strong Points	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		4	4	3	4	4	3/3
	HRS(S)	1	1	1	2	1	.5	1	.5	1		0	0	1	0	0	1/1
e. Counterattack	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3	3	3/3
	HRS(S)	2	1	1	1	1	.5	1	.5	1		1	1	1	1	1	2/1
f. Breakout/Linkup	SL	4	4	3	3	3	3	4	3	3		4	4	3	3	3	4/4
	HRS(S)	0	0	1	1	1	.5	2	.5	1		0	0	1	2	2	0/0

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROFICIENT

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MM ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	
g. C ³ Options Once the Battle Begins	SL HRS(S)	3 2	4 0	3 1	3 1	3 .5	3 1	4 0	3 .5	3 1	3 ^h 2	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 2	3 4	CGSC
7. Retrograde Operations:																	
a. Disengagement	SL HRS(S)	4 0	3 2	3 1	3 1	3 1	4 1	3 1	3 .5	3 1	3 ^h 2	4 0	4 0	3 1	4 0	4 0	IN/AR
b. Delay	SL HRS(S)	4 0	3 2	3 1	3 2	4 0	3 1	3 1	3 .5	3 1		3 1	3 1	3 2	4 0	4 0	IN/AR
c. Withdrawal	SL HRS(S)	3 2	3 2	3 1	3 2	4 0	3 1	3 1	3 .5	3 1		3 1	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	IN/AR
d. Retirement	SL HRS(S)	4 0	3 2	3 1	3 1	4 0	3 1	3 1	3 .2	3 1		3 1	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	IN/AR
8. Cavalry Operations (Air and Ground):																	
a. Concepts and Fundamentals	SL HRS(S)	4 0	3 2	3 1	3 1	3 3	3 2	4 0	3 1	3 1	3 ^h 4	3 2	3 2	3 1	3 1	3 2	AR
b. Reconnaissance	SL HRS(S)	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 .5	3 2	4 0	3 .5	3 1		4 0	4 0	3 1	3 1	4 0	AR
c. Security	SL HRS(S)	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 .5	3 1	4 0	3 .5	3 1		4 0	4 0	3 1	3 1	4 0	AR
d. Economy of Force	SL HRS(S)	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 .5	3 1	4 0	3 .5	3 1		4 0	4 0	3 1	3 1	4 0	AR
e. Operations of Divisional Cavalry (Division 86)	SL HRS(S)	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 .5		3 1	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	AR

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHEDULESPROPOSER

		IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	QM	UD	MMT	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS		
f. Covering Force		SL	4	3	4	3	4	3	4	3	3		3	4	4	4	4	3	AR
		HRS(S)	0	2	0	1	0	.5	1	0	.5	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	
9. Special Military Operations:																			
a. Military Operations in Urban Terrain		SL	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	IN
		HRS(S)	2	1	1	1	0	2	1	0	1	3	3	2	2	1	0	2	
b. Rear Area Combat Operations (RACO)																			
(1) Organization for Combat		SL	3	4	4	4	3	3	3	4	3	3 ^h	2	3	3	3	3	3/3	CGSC/MP
		HRS(S)	2	0	0	2	1	1	1	0	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	4/1	
(2) Perimeter Defense		SL	3	4	4	4	3	3	3	4	4		2	3	3	3	3	3/3	CGSC/MP
		HRS(S)	2	0	0	2	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	3	4/1	
(3) Active/Passive Security		SL	3	4	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	2	2	3	3	3	3	3/3	CGSC/MP
		HRS(S)	2	0	0	2	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	2	4/1	
(4) Weapons Employment		SL	3	4	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	3	2	3	3	3	3	3/3	CGSC/MP
		HRS(S)	2	0	0	2	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	3	4/1	
(5) Physical Layout of Rear Area		SL	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	2	3	4	4	3	3/3	CGSC/MP
		HRS(S)	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	3	1	1	0	2	2	4/1	
c. Reconstitution of Ineffective Units		SL	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	CGSC
		HRS(S)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
d. Counterinsurgency Operations		SL	3	3	4	4	4	3	3	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	IN
		HRS(S)	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	4	0	.5	1	0	0	0	0	1	
e. Counterterror Operations		SL	3	3	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	3/3	MP/IMA
		HRS(S)	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	4	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	4/1	

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPORTION

	IN	NR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OD	MM ⁱ	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	
f. Special Forces Operations	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 1	4 0	3 .5	3 1	3 1	1 0	4 0	4 0	4 1	3 1	IMA
g. Foreign Internal Defense	SL HRS(S)	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 1	3 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1		1 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1	IMA
h. Unconventional Warfare	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 .5	4 0	4 1	3 1	9 b	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 1	3 1	IMA
i. Psychological Operations	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 .5	4 0	4 1	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1	IMA
j. Civil Affairs	SL HRS(S)	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 1	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 1	4 0	3 1	IMA
k. Amphibious	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 .5	4 0	4 1	4 0	3 1	4 0	4 0	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 1	3 1	IN
l. Airborne	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 .5	3 1	4 0	3 1	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 2	3 1	3 1	IN
m. Airmobile	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 .5	3 1	3 2	3 1	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 2	3 1	3 1	IN
n. Ranger	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 .5	3 1	4 0	3 1	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 2	3 1	3 1	IN/AV
10. Considerations for Special Environments:																	
a. Desert	SL HRS(S)	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 .5	3 1	3 ^h 2	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 1	3 1	IN/RR

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROponent

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	Q4	OD	MMI	AG	FI	Q4	TC	MS	
b. Jungle	SL	3	4	4	3	4	3	3	3	3		4	4	4	4	3	3
	HRS(S)	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1		0	0	0	1		IN
c. Mountain	SL	3	4	4	3	4	3	3	3	3		4	4	4	4	3	3
	HRS(S)	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1		0	0	0	1		IN
d. Northern Regions	SL	3	4	4	3	4	3	3	3	3		4	4	4	4	3	3
	HRS(S)	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1		0	0	0	1		IN
11. Indirect Fire Support:																	
a. Request and Adjust Indirect Fire	SL	3	3	2	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3	2
	HRS(S)	4	4	8	1	1	10	4	10	1	3	4	4	2	5.5		FA
b. Artillery Effects (Shell fuze Combinations)	SL	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	4	3	4	3	3	3	3		FA
	HRS(S)	1	2	1	0	1	3	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1		FA
c. Organization, Command and Control	SL	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	4	4	4	3	3		FA
	HRS(S)	1	2	1	1	0	3	2	0	1	0	0	0	2	1		FA
d. Priorities of Support on the Extended Battlefield	SL	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4		FA
	HRS(S)	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1		FA
e. Land Space Requirements in the MBA and CFA	SL	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4		FA
	HRS(S)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		FA
12. Air Defense:																	
a. Short Range Air Defense Systems (SHORAD)	SL	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3h	3	3	3	3		AD
	HRS(S)	1	.5	1	1	0	2	2	1	.5	1	4	1	1	1		AD
b. Man Portable Air Defense Systems	SL	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3		AD
	HRS(S)	1	.5	1	1	0	4	2	1	.5	1	1	1	1	1		AD

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPORTION

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CM	OD	MI ¹	AG	F1	QM	TC	MS		
c. Non-Divisional Air Defense Systems																		
SL	3	3	4	3	4	4	3	4	3	3		4	4	3	3	3	3	AD
HRS(S)	1	.5	0	1	0	0	1	0	.5	1		0	0	1	1	1	1	
d. Unit Active Air Defense Measures																		
SL	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	4	3		3	3	3	3	3	3	AD
HRS(S)	1	.5	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	1		1	1	1	1	3	2	
e. Unit Passive Air Defense Measures																		
SL	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	4	3		3	3	3	3	3	3	AD
HRS(S)	1	.5	1	2	0	4	1	0	0	1		1	1	1	1	3	2	
f. Visual Aircraft Recognition																		
SL	4	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	4		3	3	4	3	3	3	AD
HRS(S)	0	1	1	1	0	2	1	0	.5	0		1	1	1	0	2	2	
g. Priorities of Support on the Extended Battlefield																		
SL	4	3	4	3	4	4	3	4	3	4		4	4	4	4	3	3	AD
HRS(S)	0	.5	0	1	0	0	.5	0	1	0		0	0	0	1	1	1	
h. Land Space Requirements in the MBA and CFA																		
SL	4	3	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4		4	4	4	4	4	3	AD
HRS(S)	0	.5	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	1	
13. Army Aviation																		
a. Combat Aviation																		
SL	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3 ^h	4	4	4	3	3	3	AV
HRS(S)	1	.5	.5	1	0	1	1	1	1	.5	2	0	0	1	1	1	2	
b. Combat Support Aviation																		
SL	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	3		4	4	4	3	3	3	AV
HRS(S)	1	.5	.5	1	0	1	.5	0	.5	.5		0	0	1	1	1	3	
c. Combat Service Support Aviation																		
SL	3	3	4	3	4	3	3	4	3	3		4	4	4	3	3	3	AV
HRS(S)	1	.5	0	1	0	1	.5	0	.5	1		0	0	1	1	1	2.5	
14. Tactical Nuclear Operations:																		
a. Nuclear Weapons Effects																		
SL	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3 ^h	2	3	3	3	3	3	FA
HRS(S)	2	1	2	2	0	5	1	1	1	4	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	

IN AR FA AD EN SC MP MI OM UD MM[†] AG FI QM TC MS

$$\frac{SL}{IRS(S)}$$

SL	HRS(S)								FN
4	0	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	4
4	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

[illegible][illegible]

SL	HRS(S)									FN
4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

SL	HRS(s)								CSC
3	4	3	4	3	4	4	4	4	3
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2

ST	3	3	4	3	3	3	4	4	3h	4	4	4	4	4	3	EN
HRS(S)	1	.5	0	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
ST	3	3	4	3	3	3	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	
HRS(S)	1	.5	0	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	

ST HRS(S)	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	4	4	4	4	3	3	EN
1	3	4	3	3	4	3	4	4	4	4	3	3	1	
.5	0	1	1	0	3	4	1	0	0	0	1	0		

ST	HR(S)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225	226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300	301	302	303	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311	312	313	314	315	316	317	318	319	320	321	322	323	324	325	326	327	328	329	330	331	332	333	334	335	336	337	338	339	340	341	342	343	344	345	346	347	348	349	350	351	352	353	354	355	356	357	358	359	360	361	362	363	364	365	366	367	368	369	370	371	372	373	374	375	376	377	378	379	380	381	382	383	384	385	386	387	388	389	390	391	392	393	394	395	396	397	398	399	400	401	402	403	404	405	406	407	408	409	410	411	412	413	414	415	416	417	418	419	420	421	422	423	424	425	426	427	428	429	430	431	432	433	434	435	436	437	438	439	440	441	442	443	444	445	446	447	448	449	450	451	452	453	454	455	456	457	458	459	460	461	462	463	464
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SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPORTION

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OD	MM ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	NS		
d. General Engineering	SL	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	3	3		3	3	3	4		3	EN
	HRS(S)	1	0	1	1	2	1	0	1	1		1	1	1	0		1	
e. Atomic Demolition Munition (ADM) Operations	SL	4	3	4	4	4	3	4	4	4		3	4	4	4		4	EN
	HRS(S)	0	.5	0	0	0	0	1	0	0		2	0	0	0		0	
16. NBC Warfare:																		
a. U.S. Policy	SL	3	3	3	3	1	3	3	3	3	3 ^h	3	3	3	3		3	OM
	HRS(S)	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	5	1	1	1	2		1	
b. Threat Policy	SL	3	3	3	3	1	3	4	3	3		3	3	3	3		3	OM
	HRS(S)	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1		1	1	2	2		1	
c. Survivability	SL	3	3	2	3	4	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3		3	OM
	HRS(S)	2	.5	4	1	0	4	1	3	1		1	1	2	2		2	
d. Offensive Use	SL	4	4	3	3	4	4	3	4	3		3	3	3	3		3	OM
	HRS(S)	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	1		1	1	2	1		3	
e. Defensive Use	SL	4	4	2	3	4	3	3	3	3		3	3	3	3		3	OM
	HRS(S)	0	0	4	1	0	10	1	3	1		1	1	2	1		3	
f. Reconstitution	SL	4	4	4	3	4	3	4	3	3		4	4	3	4		3	OM
	HRS(S)	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	1		0	0	1	0		1	
g. NBC Logistics	SL	4	4	4	3	4	3	4	3	3		4	4	3	4		3/3	OM/MM
	HRS(S)	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1		0	0	1	0		1/2	
17. Electronic Warfare:																		
a. Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) (Intercepting, Identifying, Analyzing, Locating)	SL	3	4	3	4	4	3	4	3	3	3 ^h	3	4	4	4		3	MI
	HRS(S)	1	0	.5	0	0	1	0	.5	.5	4	1	0	0	1		1	

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPORTION

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OD	MM ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	RS	
b. Electronic Countermasures (ECH) (Jamming, Electronic Deception)	SL IRS(S)	3 1	4 0	3 .5	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 1	4 0	.5	.5	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 1	3 1	3 1
c. Signal Security	SL IRS(S)	2 2	3 2	3 1	4 0	3 1	3 5	4 1	4 0	.5	.5	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 2	3/3 1/2
d. Integrated Operations with Tactics	SL IRS(S)	2 6	4 0	3 1	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 1	4 0	.5	.5	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 2	3 2	4 0
18. Intelligence:																	
a. Electromagnetic Intelligence	SL IRS(S)	4 0	3 .5	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 .5	3 1	4 0	.2	.5	3 ^h 1	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0
b. Imagery Intelligence	SL IRS(S)	3 1	3 .5	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 .5	4 0	4 0	.2	.5	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1
c. Human Intelligence	SL IRS(S)	3 1	3 .5	4 0	3 2	4 0	3 .5	4 0	4 0	.2	.5	4 0	4 0	3 1	4 0	4 0	3 1
d. Counterintelligence	SL IRS(S)	3 1	3 .5	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 .5	4 0	4 0	.2	.5	4 0	4 0	3 1	4 0	4 0	3 1
e. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield	SL IRS(S)	2 3	3 .5	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 .5	4 0	4 0	.2	.5	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1
f. Tactical All Source Intelligence Production and Management	SL IRS(S)	3 1	3 .5	3 1	4 0	4 0	3 2	4 0	4 0	.5	.5	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1
19. NATO Interoperability	SL IRS(S)	4 0	4 0	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1	4 0	.5	.5	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPORTION

20. Combat Service Support:

a. Transportation

(1) Load Planning

(a) Air

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OD	PMI	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS		
SL	3	3	3	4	4	3	4	4	3	3	3 ^h	4	4	4	4	3	4	TC
HRS(S)	1	.5	.5	0	0	1	0	0	.3	1	7	0	0	0	1		0	

(b) Land

SL	3	3	3	4	4	3	4	4	3	3		4	4	3	3	3	4	TC
HRS(S)	1	.5	.5	0	0	1	0	0	.3	1		0	0	1	1		0	

(c) Sea

SL	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3		4	4	4	4	4	4	TC
HRS(S)	0	.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	.3	1		0	0	0	0		0	

(2) Convoy Operations

SL	3	2	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	3		4	4	3	3	3	3	TC
HRS(S)	1	2	2	2	0	2	1	0	.2	.5		0	0	1	2		2	

(3) Movement Control

SL	3	3	3	3	4	3	4	4	3	3		4	4	3	3	3	4	TC
HRS(S)	1	.5	1	2	0	1	0	0	.3	.5		0	0	1	1		0	

(4) Aviation Logistics

SL	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3		4	4	4	4	3	4	TC
HRS(S)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5	.5		0	0	0	1		0	

b. Ammunition

(1) Support Structure and Requisitioning

SL	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	NM
HRS(S)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0		2	

(2) Safety, Storage, and Transportation

SL	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	3	3	3	NM
HRS(S)	1	.5	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2	0	0	1	1		4	

(3) Supply Rates and DAO Functions

SL	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	4	4	3	4	4	3	NM
HRS(S)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0		3	

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROFICIENT

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	CA	OD	MM ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	
(4) Munitions Identification	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	3 1	4 0	4 2	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 2
(5) Emergency Destruction Procedures	SL HRS(S)	4 0	4 0	3 2	4 0	4 0	4 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 2
(6) EOD Operations	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 .5	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 2
c. Maintenance																	
(1) Recovery and Evacuation	SL HRS(S)	3 1	4 0	3 1	3 1	4 0	3 1	3 1	3 .2	4 0	3 1	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0
(2) Command and Staff Management of Preventive Maintenance	SL HRS(S)	3 1	4 0	3 1	3 2	4 0	3 2	4 0	3 .2	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 1	3 1	3 1
(3) Repair Parts Supply (PLI)	SL HRS(S)	3 1	4 0	3 1	3 1	4 0	3 5	3 1	3 .2	4 0	3 1	3 1	3 1	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1
(4) Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS)	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 4	3 3	3 1	4 0	3 1	3 0	3 .2	4 0	3 1	3 2	3 2	3 1	3 1	3 1	4 0
(5) The Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS)	SL HRS(S)	3 1	3 4	3 2	3 2	4 0	3 5	3 1	3 .5	4 0	3 1	3 2	3 2	3 1	3 2	3 2	4 0
d. Manpower																	
(1) Accountability	SL HRS(S)	1 1	3 .5	3 2	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 0	4 0	3 1	3 ^h 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1	3 1
(2) Estimates	SL HRS(S)	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	3 1	3 0	4 0	3 1		4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0	4 0

SUBJECTSBRANCH SCHOOLSPROPOSER

	IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	QM	OD	MM	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS	
(3) Casualty Reporting/ Notification	SL 4 HRS(S) 0	3 4 .5	4 4 0	4 4 0	4 4 0	3 3 1	3 3 1	4 4 0	4 4 0	3 1 1	3 3 1	3 3 1	3 3 1	4 4 0	4 4 0	3 1 1	SSC
(4) Replacements	SL 4 HRS(S) 0	3 4 .5	4 4 0	3 4 1	4 4 0	3 3 1	3 3 1	4 4 0	4 4 0	3 1 1	3 3 1	4 4 0	4 4 0	4 4 0	4 4 0	4 4 0	SSC
(5) Health Care																	
(a) Treatment of Casualties (First Aid)	SL 1 HRS(S) 4	1 6 10	2 2 20	2 2 6	2 2 6	3 10 20	3 20 3	2 3 4	3 4 4	2 3 3	2 3 6	2 6 6	2 6 6	3 12 8	2 8 3	1 30 1	ANS
(b) Medical Evacuation	SL 3 HRS(S) 1	3 1 1	4 0 0	4 0 1	3 3 1	3 1 1	3 4 0	3 4 1	3 3 1	3 1 1	3 3 1	3 3 1	3 3 1	4 4 0	4 4 1	3 2 2	ANS
e. Supply	SL 3 HRS(S) 2	3 1 4	3 4 3	3 3 1	3 3 1	3 40 4	3 4 0	3 4 1	3 1 2	3 2 3	3 8 6	3 6 6	3 6 6	3 4 3	3 3 3	3 1 1	QM
f. Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL)	SL 3 HRS(S) 1	3 1 1	4 0 0	4 0 0	4 4 0	3 1 1	3 4 0	3 4 1	3 3 0	4 4 1	3 3 1	4 4 0	4 4 0	3 3 1	4 4 0	3 3 1	QM
g. Subistence	SL 3 HRS(S) 1	3 1 1	4 0 0	4 0 1	3 3 1	3 1 1	3 4 0	3 4 1	3 3 0	4 4 1	3 3 1	4 4 0	4 4 0	3 3 1	4 4 0	3 3 1	QM
h. Field Services	SL 3 HRS(S) 1	3 1 1	4 0 0	4 0 1	3 3 1	3 3 1	3 3 1	3 3 1	3 3 0	4 4 1	3 3 1	4 4 0	4 4 0	3 3 1	4 4 0	3 3 1	QM
21. Fundamentals of Combat:																	
a. Vehicle Recognition	SL 3 HRS(S) 1	3 2 6	3 3 1	3 3 0	4 4 0	3 1 1	3 4 0	3 4 1	3 4 1	3 1 1	3 1 1	3 1 1	3 1 1	3 1 1	3 1 2	3 2 2	CATRAOA
b. POW Processing	SL 3 HRS(S) 1	4 4 0	3 3 2	4 4 0	4 4 0	3 3 1	4 4 1	4 4 0	4 4 0	3 3 1	3 3 1	4 4 0	4 4 0	4 4 0	4 4 0	4/3 0/1	MP/MI

SUBJECTS

BRANCH SCHOOLS

PROPOSER

		IN	AR	FA	AD	EN	SC	MP	MI	OM	OD	NH ¹	AG	FI	QM	TC	MS		
c. Geneva Convention	SL	1	3	2	2	3	3	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		3	JA
	HRS(S)	2	1	2	3	1	1	2	5	1	2	1	1	1	3	2		2	
d. Code of Conduct	SL	1	2	2	2	3	1	3	1	3	3	3	3	3	2	3		3	IMA
	HRS(S)	1	2	3	4	1	2	2	15	1	1	1	1	1	4	2		1	
e. Process Captured Documents and Material	SL	3	3	3	4	4	3	3	2	4	3	3	3	4	4	3		4/3	NP/MI
	HRS(S)	1	1	2	0	0	1	1	10	0	.5	1	1	0	0	1		0/1	
f. Land Navigation	SL	2	3	1	2	2	2	2	1	3	1	2	1	2	3	2		2	IN
	HRS(S)	20	10	16	30	10	50	30	15	3	30	6	10	10	7	6		20	
g. Use of Organic Radio Equipment (Radio and Wire Communications)	SL	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	3	3		3	SC
	HRS(S)	4	2	8	12	2	20	10	5	1	8	10	10	10	3	4		20	
h. Smoke Operations	SL	3	3	4	3	4	3	3	4	3	3	3	4	4	3	3		4/3	FA/CM
	HRS(S)	1	.5	0	1	0	1	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	1		0/2	
i. Strategic Deployment	SL	4	3	4	4	4	3	3	4	3	4	3	4	4	4	4		3	CGSC
	HRS(S)	0	.5	0	0	0	1	2	0	.5	0	1	0	0	0	0		6	
j. Training Management	SL	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	3		3	CGSC
	HRS(S)	2	2	4	2	4	20	10	4	1	2	1	8	8	5	3		8	
k. How to Train	SL	2	3	3	3	3	d	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	3		3	CATRADA
	HRS(S)	10	3	4	6	4		10	3	2	1	1	8	8	5	4		"	

- NOTES:
- Concept deleted per draft FM 100-5, dated Jan 81.
 - Includes integrated battlefield.
 - /// is 25 Track/72 Track, CPT only.
 - How to Train included in Training Management.
 - Cav/Ar
 - Consolidation at para 5a, 6a, 8a.
 - Included in 9d and e.
 - Consolidated entry for paragraph or subparagraph below.
 - Missile and Munition Center, Specialty Codes 73 and 75.
 - /// is Warrant Officer Candidate Military Development Course/Initial Entry Rotary Wing Course.
 - See para 6f, breakout and link-up.
 - See para 8b, cavalry reconnaissance.
 - Treated as an obstacle under engineer subjects.
 - Not applicable to CA LTs.
 - Missile and Munition Center does not teach an Officer Advanced Course yet, IRS(P) not reported.
 - /// is Aviation Warrant Officer Advanced Course/Warrant Officer Senior Course.
 - More than half AMEDD officers accessions are direct commissions. All subjects rated SL-4, IRS(S)-0.